



The sexual practices of a small percentage of Americans is costing the 
American public billions of dollars each year. The United States has the highest 
sexually transmitted disease (STD) 1 infection rate in the industrialized world, a 
rate 50 to 100 times that of other industrialized countries.2 There are a multitude 
of reasons why Americans’ sexual disease rate is out of control. This article 
discusses tort law’s role in allowing some Americans to view sex and sexual 
partners with no regard for safety or health, and concludes that the current 
negligence-based analysis in sex tort3 cases should be replaced by strict 
liability.
The law can directly impact public opinion and behavior through its deterrence, 
expressive, and educational functions.4 While various other forms of state 
action are vitally important to controlling social threats,5 tort law is the 
barometer of minimal civil expectations in interpersonal relations. Prior to the 
mid 20th century sex tort law offered protection against reputation and 
emotional injury resulting from unfair or fraudulently-induced seduction, but 
the “heartbalm” torts were substantially eviscerated in the latter half of the 20th
century. As a result, a “caveat emptor” standard in sex tort actions emerged. 
This standard has probably contributed to  the major epidemic of STDs that has 
developed in the United States in the last 306 years by failing to discourage 
irresponsible sexual practices. 
The urgency of a national sexual disease epidemic necessitates a reassessment 
of the proper standard in cases alleging sexual misconduct.  Courts have 
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1 Formerly referred to as VD (venereal disease),  STDs (“sexually transmitted 
diseases”), or STIs (sexually transmitted infections) refer to a number of infections that affect 
human genitalia and are transmitted sexually. See, e.g.,  Barbara K. Hecht, Ph.D. and Frederick 
Hecht, M.D., Condoms and Sexually Transmitted Infections, at www.MedicineNet.com (last 
editorial review, July 7, 2004). 
2 See, e.g., Mary G. Leary, Tort Liability For Sexually Transmitted Disease, 88 
Am Jur Trials 153, Section 1 (Updated June, 2004); AMERICAN SOCIAL HEALTH 
ASSOCIATION, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES: HOW MANY CASES AND AT 
WHAT COST? (Kaiser Family Foundation, Menlo Park, California, December 1998) (hereinafter 
“ASHA – WHAT COST?”)
3 I coined the phrase “sex torts” to refer to any conduct actionable in tort 
relating to sexual conduct, including sexual fraud and battery. However, this article focuses 
exclusively on sexual relations resulting in disease transmission. 
4 See, e.g., Pound, Theory of Social Interests, 4 Pub.Am.Soc.Society 15 (1920). 
Tort doctrine is intended to control social choices by deterring socially undesirable, blameworthy, 
and/or uneconomical behavior, and to provide compensation to victims of civil wrongdoing. See
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, 12-25 (West 2000).
5 For example, compulsory education for minors and criminal law. 
6 See generally, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, 
CONFRONTING SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES (National Academy Press 
1997)(Thomas R. Eng & William T. Butler, Eds.) (hereinafter, “THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC”).
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engaged a negligence-based paradigm in sexual disease cases based on 
historical precedent in contagious disease cases. However, courts’ opinions in 
these cases reflect tension between anti-heartbalm sentiment and the public 
policy of slowing the disease rate by all means, including tort liability.  This 
tension, coupled with the general fact-intensive case by case negligence 
analysis, has resulted in unclear legal standards and very uncertain liability 
even in cases of clear causation. The negligence-based paradigm deters sexual 
disease lawsuits and fails to deter sexual disease perpetrators.  This in turn 
contributes to the “hidden” nature of the sexual disease epidemic and does not 
further the law’s  compensatory, deterrence, and educational goals. 
Although modifying tort law is not the sole remedy for America’s sexual 
problem, it could address the problem much more effectively than it currently 
does. Adopting a strict liability approach to sexual disease transmission in lieu 
of the current negligence standard would further the public policies of 
encouraging accountability by forcing disease perpetrators to internalize the 
costs of their behavior, providing a greater likelihood of compensation to 
victims, and ultimately, educating the public about the very serious and 
pervasive health threat at hand. 
This paper will proceed in three parts. Section two will focus on the facts of 
sexual disease, including data relating to the number of infections in the United 
States, the annual medical costs, and who is responsible for the high infection 
rate. Section three will briefly review the history of sex tort jurisprudence in 
America over the past century and describe current sex tort law’s inefficient  
negligence-based jurisprudence relative to the new wave of sex tort litigation 
based on disease transmission. Section four argues that strict liability is a 
superior theory of sex tort liability in accordance with traditional tort doctrine, 
economic choice theory, behavioral choice theory, and the expressive function 
of law.
II.  THE STATE’S INTEREST IN SLOWING THE
SPREAD OF SEXUAL DISEASE
“The health of the people is an economic asset. The law recognizes its 
preservation as a matter of importance to the state. To the individual nothing is 
more valuable than health.” 7
America’s sexual disease rate is unprecedented and unparalleled. Immediate 
attention to this issue is required at every level of government, to educate the 
public and slow disease transmission by all means possible.  Nearly ten years 
ago, the Institute of Medicine made the following statement:
7 Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 325-6, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (1919).
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“STDs are hidden epidemics of enormous health and economic consequences in 
the United States. . . . All Americans have an interest in STD prevention 
because all communities are impacted by STDs and all individuals directly or 
indirectly pay for the costs of these diseases. . . . To successfully prevent STDs, 
many stakeholders need to redefine their mission, refocus their efforts, modify 
how they deliver services, and accept new responsibilities. In this process, 
strong leadership, innovating thinking, partnerships, and adequate resources 
will be required. The additional investment required to effectively prevent 
STDs may be considerable, but it is negligible when compared with the likely 
return on the investment. The process of preventing STDs must be a 
collaborative one. No agency, organization or sector can effectively do it alone; 
all members of the community must do their part. A successful national 
initiative to confront and prevent STDs requires widespread public awareness 
and participation and bold national leadership from the highest levels.”8
This paper focuses exclusively on changes to tort law that will meet the goal of 
slowing down the sexual disease rate better than current tort law jurisprudence. 
Changes to tort law are but one piece of a larger  project that must be taken 
seriously to minimize the tragic consequences that result from sexual disease. 
A.  The Facts Regarding The Sexual Disease Epidemic In America
Sexually transmitted diseases, or STDs, are caused by more than 25 infectious 
organisms that are transmitted through sexual activity.9 In the 1960’s, the only 
significant STDs were syphilis and gonorrhea, both of which were easily cured 
with antibiotics.10  Since 1980, however, at least 8 new STDs have been 
identified, including HIV/AIDS.11  STDs accounted for 87% of all cases among 
the top ten most frequently reported infections in the U.S. during 1997.12  Five 
8 Concluding statement from the Institute of Medicine’s Summary Report 
(1997), see THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 43. 
9 Z.A. Memish & A.O. Osoba, Sexually transmitted diseases and travel, 21 Int. 
J. Antimicrob Agents, 131-4 (2003).
10 Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) Facts and Complications, Westside 
Pregnancy Resource Center, at http://www.w-cpc.org/sexuality/std.html (Medical Institute for 
Sexual Health [MISH], 1994).  For more information, contact MISH, PO Box 4919, Austin, 
Texas 78765-4919, (800) 892 -9484.  See also Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 CalApp.3d 992, 997, 
n.3,  198 Cal.Rptr. 271 (1984), noting that the reason that genital herpes was not listed among the 
“venereal diseases” listed in the California Health and Safety Code (Section 3001) was that the 
section was enacted in 1957, before herpes was considered a public health threat. 
11 THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra n.  6 at 3. For definitions and symptoms of 
the most common sexually transmitted diseases, see Tort Liability for Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases, supra  n.  2.  
12 W. Cates, Jr. & K.M. Stone, Family Planning, Sexually Transmitted Diseases 
and Contraceptive Choice: A Literature Update – Part I, 24 Family Planning Perspectives 75-84 
(March/April 1992).  
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of the top 10 reportable13 infectious diseases in 1997 were either exclusively or 
largely transmitted during sex, including the top four: Chlamydia, gonorrhea, 
AIDS and syphilis.14  Currently, it is estimated that between 70 and 100 million 
Americans have been infected with a STD, with 15.3 million new cases15 of 
STDs among Americans every year, including 3 million new cases of STDs 
annually among American teenagers.16 In 1993, a review of actual causes of 
death in the United States estimated that 30,000 deaths occurred as a result of 
unprotected intercourse, leading to the finding that “unprotected intercourse 
now represents one of the most rapidly increasing causes of death in the 
country.”17 While the public may believe that AIDS is the most dangerous 
STD, this is not the reality at all if the numbers of persons afflicted is 
considered.18 HIV/AIDS is not the only STD that is life-threatening; left 
untreated, diseases such as gonorrhea, syphilis, genital herpes, and the human 
papilloma virus, can cause serious health consequences, can lead to various 
forms of cancer, and can kill.19
13
“Reportable” means that health care providers are required to report cases to 
state health departments and the CDC.  Id. See also ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra n. 2 at 4. 
14 See  Cates & Stone, supra n. 12. 
15 Note that there is a difference between number of cases of STDs and number 
of person infected, because the same very sexually active core group members are experiencing 
multiple infections and each infection is counted as a case.  Thus, the case number will exceed 
the number of people infected.  Interview with Professor Ed Laumann, University of Chicago 
Department of Sociology, August 3, 2005. 
16 ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2 at 8, 12; D. Fleming, et al., Herpes 
Simplex Virus Type 2 in the United States, 1976-1994, 337 N. Engl. J. Med 1105-1111 (1997). 
17 J.M. McGinnis & W.H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 
18 J. Amer. Med. Assoc. 2207, 2210 (1993). More than 25 diseases are spread primarily through 
sexual activity, leading the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to conclude that STDs are one of 
the most under-recognized health problems in the United States. CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, TRACKING THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, TRENDS IN STDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1-2 (2000)(hereinafter “CDC-TRENDS”). See also THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra 
n. 6 at 1-4. 
18 It is an established principle in public health law that a health risk that causes 
a less serious health problem (such as serious illness and possibly cancer, leading to death, i.e., 
genital herpes) can have a much larger impact on overall public health if it applies to a larger 
percentage of the population than a health risk that has a higher probability of causing death 
(such as AIDS) if it applies to a much smaller percentage of the population.  See, e.g., Geoffrey 
Rose, Sick Individuals and Sick Populations, 14 Int’l J. Epidemiology 32, 32-38 (1985); 
ROBERT ROSENTHAL, META-ANALYTIC PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 
(rev. ed. 1991). In 1991, AIDS represented less than one half of one percent of all new cases of 
STDs.  That is, approximately 50,000 new cases of AIDS were reported, relative to 12 million 
cases of other STDs, some of which can lead to deadly consequences resulting from increased 
susceptibility to various forms of cancer. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, STD/HIV 
PREVENTION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT.
19 EDWARD O. LAUMANN, JOHN H. GAGNON, ROBERT T. MICHAEL, 
& STUART MICHAELS, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 377-8 (1994).   
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Bacterial STDs, such as Chlamydia,20 gonorrhea, syphilis, and trichomoniasis, 
are usually curable21 with antibiotic treatment and rendered non-infectious if 
detected, although researchers believe that as many as 80% of those infected are 
unaware of their infection.22  If left untreated, bacterial STDs can cause pelvic 
inflammatory disease in women, which can lead to infertility and chronic 
pain.23
Half of all new STD infections are viral and incurable.24 Viral STDs, such as 
genital herpes (aka HSV-2 or Herpes Simplex II), HPV (human papilloma 
virus), hepatitis B, and AIDS, are incurable, and may be transmitted throughout 
the life of the carrier.25  Genital herpes and HPV are sharply on the rise. Genital 
herpes and HPV accounted for 65 of the approximately 68 million infections 
among Americans in 1998; recent estimates are that at least 100  million 
Americans are affected by these two viruses today, or approximately one in 
20 Chlamydia trachomatis is the second most common bacterial infection in the 
United States, with 3 million new cases each year, and there are about 650,000 cases of 
gonorrhea. ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra n. 2 at 5, 16-17.  These curable bacterial infections 
are largely asymptomatic, with 75% of women and 40% of men unaware of their Chlamydia 
infection, and many women unaware that they have gonorrhea. CDC – TRENDS, supra n. 17 at 
6. Without knowing of the infection, people do not seek treatment, and often pass it on to many 
others before they even know that they are infected.  If left untreated, up to 40% of women with 
Chlamydia will develop pelvic inflammatory disease (PID), and gonorrhea is also a major cause 
of PID. CDC –TRENDS, supra n. 17 at 6, 9.  PID in turn causes infertility in 20% of women who 
have it, and at least 15% of all infertile American women are infertile because of tubal damage 
caused by PID. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra n. 6 at 5.  Ectopic pregnancy results in 9% of 
PID cases, making ectopic pregnancy one of the leading and most preventable causes of maternal 
death during pregnancy. Id. at 5. See also http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/dstd/Stats-
_Trends/1998_Surv_Rpt_main_pg.htm. The highest rate of acute infection requiring 
hospitalization for Chlamydia is among teenagers between the ages of 15 and 19. CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ANNUAL REPORT, 1993. It is estimated that one in four sexually 
active teens have Chlamydia, and that 75% of infected young women, and 25% of infected young 
men have no symptoms. JUST THE FACTS: ABOUT TEEN SEX, at 
www.cvillepregnancy.org/teenfacts.html, citing Urological Clinic of North America. Thus, 
although curable, these bacterial infections wreak havoc on Americans’ health  because they 
often go undetected, they are transmitted easily, and they can cause serious secondary health 
issues, especially in women.
21 Gonorrhea, however, has become entirely resistant to penicillin, and the 
newer quinolone class of antibiotics, such as Cipro and Floxin, are quickly becoming ineffective 
in the United States and abroad because of the bacterium’s increasing resistance to the drugs. J. 
Todd Weber, Director of the CDC’s Office of Antimicrobial Resistance, JAMA Editorial, Nov. 
2005 (quoted in U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 55). 
22 Moscitiicki, B., et al, The Use and Limitations of Endocervical Gram Stains 
and Mucupurulent Cervicitis as Predictors for Chlamydia Trachomatis in Female Adolescents, 
157 Amer. J. Obstet. and Gynec., 1 (July 1987).; CDC – TRENDS, supra n. 17 at 6; THE 
HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra n. 6 at 7-8.  
23 CDC – TRENDS, supra n. 17 at 6-13; THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra n. 6 
at 5.
24 CDC – TRENDS, supra n. 17 at 1-2; ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2 at 
5. 
25 AHSA – WHAT COST?,  supra n. 2 at 6. 
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four Americans.26  These two viruses are rapidly infecting Americans and can 
lead to tragic consequences, including cancer and death.
Genital herpes is the most common viral STD among Americans. The number 
of Americans who are infected with herpes grew by 30% between the late 70’s 
and late 90’s, such that 20%-25% of persons over age 12 in the U.S. have 
genital herpes as of 1998, or 45 million Americans.27  Some researchers believe 
that the number of symptomatic cases of herpes in the U.S. grew eleven fold
during the 1970s and 1980s.28 Complications associated with genital herpes 
include meningitis, cervical cancer, miscarriage, premature delivery, and high 
mortality rate of babies born to mothers with herpes.29
The human papilloma virus, or HPV, is one of the two most common new cases 
of STDs in the U.S., the other being trichomoniasis;30 these two STDs account 
for 70% of new cases each year.31 It is estimated that 20 million Amercians 
currently have HPV and another 5.5 milion are infected every year.32
Researchers in Seattle recently estimated that 80% of sexually active 
Americans will acquire at least one strain of HPV at some point in their lives.33
There are at least 30 distinct strains of HPV that can infect human genitalia, 
some of which cause genital warts.34 Some strains are controlled by the body’s 
26 ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2 at 5. This figure is no doubt higher 
today, as this study was conducted 7 years ago, and around 15 million new cases occur every year 
in the United States.  Id. at 4. 
27 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG: HOW 
BIG IS THE STD EPIDEMIC IN THE U.S.?  (Dec. 2, 1998)(available online at 
http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/1445-std_qa.crm) (hereinafter “TIP OF THE ICEBERG”); D. 
Fleming, et al., Herpes Simplex Virus Type 2 in the United States, 1976-1994, 337 N. Engl. J. 
Med 1105 (1997).
28 ASHA – WHAT COST?,   supra n. 2 at 17. 
29 See R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 107 n.5 (1988), citing B.N. v. K.K., 
312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175, 1178 (1988)(citing K. HOLMES, L. COREY & P. PEGRAM, JR.,  
SEXUALLY TRANSMISSIBLE DISEASES, VENEREAL INFECTION, CLINICAL 
CONCEPTS OF INFECTIONS DISEASES, 232, 245 (3d ed. 1982). 
30 Trichomoniasis is a microscopic parasite, and therefore curable. If left 
untreated, it increases the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, and can cause premature birth and low 
birth weight babies among infected pregnant women. There is currently no national surveillance 
data on trichomoniasis, but it is estimated that 5 million cases of trichomoniasis occur each year 
in the United States, and this disease accounts for half of all curable STIs worldwide. ASHA-
WHAT COST?, supra n. 12 at 18.  Yet, only 2% of men and 3% of women named 
trichomoniasis when asked to identify known STDs. TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra  n. 27. 
31 TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra  n. 27. ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra n. 2 at 
20.
32 CDC – TRENDS, supra n. 17 at 2.
33 Daniel E. Montano, Ph.D., Danuta Kasprzyk, Ph.D., Linda Carlin, Ph.D., & 
Crystal Freeman, Ph.D., Executive Summary, HPV Provider Survey: Knowledge, Attitudes, and 
Practices About Genital HPV Infection and Related Conditions, Centers for Public Health 
Research and Evaluation, Seattle (June 14, 2005) (available online).  
34 CDC – TRENDS, supra  n. 17 at 18. 
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immune system without the carrier ever knowing about it. 35  But the more 
dangerous strains cause “subclinical” infections, so-called because they are 
invisible and often go undetected or may lie dormant for years.36   At least some 
of these strains lead to a variety of cancers, including cancer of the cervix, 
vagina, vulva, anus, and penis.37 HPV causes more than 90% of all cases of 
cervical cancer in women, the seventh most common type of cancer in 
women,38 a disease that kills about 5000 women every year in the United 
States.39  There were approximately 20 million cases of HPV in America in 
1998, with 5.5 million new cases estimated each year, or probably close to 60 
million today.40 More recent research indicates that there are 6.2 million new 
cases annually, driving the figure up higher.41 There is no cure for HPV, it 
causes the largest number of STD-related life-threatening illnesses next to 
AIDS, and it is the fastest growing STD in America.42 One of the biggest 
problems with HPV is that research shows that condoms may have little, if any, 
effect on preventing this disease.43  Yet, of Americans polled, only 8% of men 
and 13% of women were able to identify HPV as a common STD when asked 
to name STDs of which they have heard.44
Americans’ lack of knowledge about HPV is representative of a more 
generalized ignorance about STDs. The American public is frighteningly 
unaware of this epidemic, with surveys showing that around 70% of men and 
women think that less than 10% of Americans will get an STD in their lifetime, 
35 Id. 
36 THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 8; CDC – TRENDS, supra  n. 
137at 18.  Four strains of HPV, type 16, 18, 31 & 45, account for 80% of all cervical cancer. Id. 
37 THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 4; CDC – TRENDS, supra  n. 17 
at 18. 
38 THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 4.
39 HPV is believed to cause almost all cases of cancer of the vagina, vulva, 
penis, and anus. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 4. HPV type 16 is believed to be 
carried by 20 million people in the United States, and another 5.5 are infected each year. See
MEDICAL COLLEGE OF WISCONSIN, HEALTHLINK, online at 
http://healthlink.mcs.edu/article/976735469.html (updated 10/16/2001). This virus is responsible 
for 50% of all cases of cervical cancer.   Id.  Two strains of HPV, 16 and 18, are believed to be 
responsible for 90% of all cervical cancer cases, leading to nearly 5000 deaths in the U.S. each 
year.  See TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra  n.  27. 
40 ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra n. 2 at 17-18. CDC – TRENDS, supra n. 17 
at 2. This report contains disease-specific information, including areas within the United States 
that are most heavily hit with particular sexual diseases. See also ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra 
n. 2 at 5.
41 Montano, et al, supra  n. 33. 
42 THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 6. 
43 Cates & Stone, supra n. 12.  See also Montano, et al, supra  n. 33. Although 
the effect of condom use in preventing HPV is inconclusive, condoms can reduce the risk of two 
most common HPV related conditions: genital warts and cervical cancer.  Id. 
44 Montano, et al., supra  n. 33. While clinicians are generally aware of the 
prevalence of HPV, only 63% knew that genital HPV in men increases the risk of penile and 
anogential cancers.
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although the true figure is at least 25%,45 with recent estimates as high as 
80%,46 and growing.  Even worse, it is estimated that over 80% of persons who 
are infected with an STD do not know that they have an infection.47 In 1993, 
84% of women surveyed were not concerned about acquiring an STD, 
including 72% of young women (18-24) and 78% of women who reported 
having “many” sexual partners.48  In general, the health consequences of STDs, 
are “hidden” from public attention for several reasons, including: most people 
who have an STD do not know that they have one;49 Major health consequences 
of STDs, such as infertility, cancer, and chronic pain, occur years after the 
initial infection, so the link between the STD and the health consequences is not 
recognized. And, the stigma attached to contracting an STD inhibits open 
public discourse, education, and legal redress.50 Americans of all ages are 
confronted with an enormous health risk that is largely silent.51
45 ASHA-WHAT COST?, supra n. 2 at 6, 10.   The surveys were conducted by 
the Kaiser Family Foundation and Glamour Magazine. Id. at 10. 
46 See Montano et al., supra  n. 33.
47 See Moscitiicki et al., supra n. 22. 
48 EDK ASSOCIATES, WOMEN  & SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED 
DISEASES: THE DANGERS OF DENIAL (New York: EDK Associates 1994). 
49 Moscitiicki et al, supra  n.  22. The silent nature of this epidemic is probably 
the greatest public health threat.  In general, STDs are more severe and occur more frequently 
among women, in part because they are transmitted most readily from a male to a female, and in 
part because they are more likely to remain undetected in females. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, 
supra n. 6 at 3.  Almost every STD can be transmitted from a pregnant woman to her fetus, with 
tragic consequences based on the immature immune system of a fetus, which include: low birth 
weight, premature birth, conjunctivitis, pneumonia, neurologic problems, and congenital 
abnormalities. ASHA – WHAT COST?,  supra n. 2 at p. 9. STDs can also be transmitted to 
babies through breastfeeding. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra n. 6 at 2.  
50 It is important to understand a bit about American sexual cultures and norms 
to fashion the most effective policy.  American sexuality is largely private and secret relative to 
other societies, a vestige of the Victorian social system. See, e.g., A.M. BRANDT, NO MAGIC 
BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE SINCE 1980 (1985).  Social 
taboos regarding sexuality juxtaposed to constant sexual images in the mass media, and 
particularly the internet, have created a culture where sexual cognitive dissonance is ubiquitous, 
which leads to unhealthy sexual behavior, such as promiscuous, clandestine sex.  The American 
conception of sex has impeded sexuality and STD education programs, hindered communications 
among family members, and has promoted a fixation on sexuality. Contrary to the popular 
assumption that Victorian values have caused sexual repression in America, Michel Foucault 
argues that American discourse and fixation on sex is more about producing and using sex as 
power than about repression. That is, sexual choices derive their meaning through social 
discourse about sex, labeling people in accordance with their sexuality, and otherwise socially 
constructing meaning grounded in sexual behavior. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY, AN INTRODUCTION, VOL. I. 17-49 (1978) American secrecy regarding sex 
and the attendant lack of communication and education regarding STDs, coupled with a 
proliferation of sexual images in the mass media and increased sexuality in American youth, has 
created a recipe for the very serious STD epidemic we face today. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, 
supra  n. 6 at 10-12. For example, there are 10 incidents of sexual behavior per hour on prime 
time television, but most of the images depict non-marital sexual relationships as the norm and 
fail to broach the subject of contraception or sexual disease. Id.  This irresponsible production has 
an enormous impact on young people’s sexual mores, yet is protected by the first amendment.  
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The impact of STDs on America’s youth is particularly troublesome.52
Adolescents and young adults have the highest rates of sexually transmitted 
diseases.53 Approximately 25% of sexually active American teens contracts an 
STD every year.54  About half of all new HIV infections occur in people under 
age 25; most are infected through sex.55 AIDS is the 6th leading cause of death 
among 15-25 year old Americans.56   Every day, 8000 teenagers in the United 
States contract an STD, approximately 3 Million per year, or about 1 every 10 
seconds.57 At least two-thirds of people who acquire STDs in the United States 
are younger than 25; at least one quarter are teenagers, 58  and it appears that the 
percentage of young people afflicted is rising.59 Teenage girls have the highest 
rate of Chlamydia, 60  a common cause of pelvic inflammatory disease (PID), 
See, e.g., D.T. Lowry & J.A. Schidler, Prime Time TV Portrayals of Sex, “Safe Sex,” and AIDS: 
A Longitudinal Analysis. 70 Journalism Q. 628 (1993).   
51 Over half of adults and teens surveyed stated that their doctors spent “no time 
at all” discussing STDs with them. ASHA – WHAT COST, supra n.  2 at 10. See also THE 
HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra n. 6 at 4-13.
52 In California alone, approximately 1.2 million cases of STDs occur each 
year, approximately 250,000 of which occur among teenagers. Communicable Disease Control in 
California, Division of Communicable Disease Control, California Department of Health 
Services, Sacramento, California, at www.dhs.ca.gov/dcdc.  In one study from the University of 
Washington, among university students, cervical infection was 8 times greater than all other STD 
infections combined. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
SERVICES, EMERGING SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES (1998), available online at 
http://depts.washington.edu/eminf/1998/std/std1.htm. Yet, only one in five teens say that they 
think they are at risk of getting an STD.  See ASHA – WHAT COST, supra n.  2 at 10. Perhaps 
for this reason, most single men and women (2/3) say that they do not consistently use condoms.  
Id.
53 ASHA – WHAT COST, supra n.  2 at 8 (two-thirds of all new STD cases 
occur in people ages 15-24);  Diane R. Blake, Adolescent Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Recent 
Developments, 6 Curr Infect. Dis. Rep. 141 (April 2004). 
54 ASHA – WHAT COST, supra n.  2 at 8.
55 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FACT SHEET: YOUNG PEOPLE 
AT RISK - HIV/AIDS AMONG AMERICA’S YOUTH, 2002; CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE IN ADOLESCENTS, L265 Slide Series (through 
2002).  Among American youth, minorities have been hit particularly hard by HIV/AIDS, with 
young black women representing 65% of AIDS cases reported among 13-19 year olds in 2002; 
Latino teens represented 20%. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS 
SURVEILLANCE IN ADOLESCENTS, L265 Slide Series (through 2002).
56 JUST THE FACTS: ABOUT TEEN SEX, available online 
www.cvillepregnancy.org/teenfacts.html, About 25% of all new HIV cases are found in people 
under age 22; about 50% of all new HIV cases are found in people under age 25. CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV PREVENTION STRATEGIC PLAN 
THROUGH 2005 (September 2000). 
57 MEG MEEKER, HOW TEEN SEX IS KILLING OUR KIDS 12 (2002). 
58 ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2 at 8; THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG, 
supra n. 27. 
59 MEEKER, supra n. 57;  THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 13. 
60 CDC – TRENDS, supra n. 17 at 11. The ectropion of the cervix of a female 
teenager is physically more vulnerable to infection than that of a woman in her 20’s.  J.R. 
Anderson & M. Wilson, Caring for Teenagers with Salpingitis, Contemporary OB/GYN (August 
1990).  One result is that sexually active 15 year olds have a 1 in 8 chance of developing PID but 
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which can lead to infertility; at least 10 percent of sexually active teens are 
infected with this disease.61
There are a number of reasons why teenagers and young adults are at the 
greatest risk for acquiring an STD: they may have less immunity than adults; 
they are more likely to have multiple sex partners and to select partners who are 
high-risk; they are more likely to engage in unprotected sex; and the age of first 
sexual activity has decreased while the age at first marriage has increased, 
resulting in more non-marital, non-monogamous sexual activity.62 In sum, 
American teens and young adults are becoming sexually active at a younger age 
than prior generations and have more sexual partners.63 Indeed, the United 
States and Canada currently have the youngest age of first sexual experience, at 
by age 24, that probability decreases to 1 in 80. L. WESTRON & P. MARCH, PELVIC 
INFLAMMATORY DISEASE (1992).  
61 L. Westrom, Incidence, Prevalence, and Trends of Acute Pelvic Inflammatory 
Disease and Its Consequences in Industrialized Countries, 138 Amer. J. of Obstet. &  Gynec. 880 
(1980). 
62 THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 13; CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, 2003 STD SURVEILLANCE REPORT.  Alcohol and other substance abuse are 
known to be associated with high risk sexual behavior that leads to STDs, both generally and 
among youth. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 9.
63 A 1999 Durex Survey revealed similar trends on a worldwide basis. Teens 
and young adults around the world are having sex at a younger age than previous generations, 
and are having sex more frequently and with more partners. 1999 DUREX GLOBAL SEX 
SURVEY.   The survey was commissioned by the London International Group, Inc., the parent 
company of Durex Consumer Products, which manufactures Durex condoms, the world’s leading 
condom manufacturer, with a 21 percent share of the global market. Five thousand sexually 
active and non-sexually active 16 to 21 year olds across 14 countries were studied.  The United 
States and Canada have the lowest average age of first sex, at 15 years of age – and the age of a 
young person’s first sexual experience is declining at an alarming rate.  Overall, on average, the 
sexually active 16 to 21 year olds have sex 98 times per year, and globally the average number of 
partners is 4.9, whereas in the United States, the average number of partners is 7.5, ranking 
highest in number of partners.  Researchers believe that the sexual behavior of youths can be 
attributed to the amount of anxiety and fear experienced by teens on a daily basis, with young 
people imitating adult sexual behavior as a means of escape. Id., quoting Dr. Robert D. 
Simmermon, psychologist, Atlanta, Georgia. Nearly one-fifth of the 16 to 21 year olds claimed 
they knew someone with a sexually transmitted disease, and 7 percent stated that they knew a 
peer who was HIV positive.  In 1993, the World Bank estimated that STDs excluding AIDS are 
the second leading cause of healthy life lost among women ages 15-44 in the developing 
countries.  See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1993). While 28% of the 
youths globally stated that they would prefer to receive sex education from their parents, friends 
are cited as the primary source of sex education. Only 11% of teens get most of their sex 
education from parents or family; most learn through peers whose information is largely 
inaccurate.  See THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 11.  Clearly, sexual disease education 
is desperately needed to help curb the sexual disease rate among American youths. The so called 
“abstinence only” sex education method is counterproductive and exacerbating the sexual disease 
problem, because it fails to educate youth about birth control and protection from disease. 
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age 15.64 Early sexual activity is clearly linked to a greater number of sexual 
partners and a greater risk of acquiring a sexually transmitted disease.65
B. The Enormous Health Care Costs Of STDs
The most recent estimates of the costs of STDs in the United States are 
astounding and underscore the need for immediate changes in education, public 
policy, and law. Experts estimate that the medical costs alone associated with 
sexual disease in the United States already exceeds $16 billion per year, and  is 
growing rapidly.66   In 2004, researchers with the Alan Guttmacher Institute 
estimated that the direct67 costs of STDs, including HIV, among all age-groups 
64 1999 DUREX GLOBAL SEX SURVEY, supra  n. 63. 
65 The Centers for Disease Control data reveals that the percentage of American 
high school students who have had sex decreased 7.4% from 1991 to 2003, from 54.1% to 46.7%. 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 
(May 2004) MMWR 2004:53 (No. SS-2).  Yet, despite publicity of a current “abstinence 
movement” among American youth, research shows a dramatic increase in adolescent sexual 
activity in the last few decades. Some research has shown that between 60 and 65% of high 
school seniors have had sex and one study from 1995 found that 27% of high school seniors have 
had 4 or more partners. JUST THE FACTS: ABOUT TEEN SEX,  
www.cvillepregnancy.org/teenfacts.html (60.5%).  This source also states that 77% of 19 year old 
females and 85% of 19 year old males have had sex, citing THE URBAN INSTITUTE, 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOLESCENT MALES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD 
HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1995), and CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH (1995).  See also ASPEN 
EDUCATION GROUP, SEXUAL PROMISCUITY IN ADOLESCENTS, available online at 
www.aspeneducation.com/factsheetpromiscuity.html (66.4%).  At least one study has found that 
25% of 6th graders, and 33% of 7th graders, and half of 8th graders have had sexual intercourse. 
THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra  n. 6 at 13. For more information, contact SADD, Inc. PO Box 
800 Marlborough, MA 01752, (877) SADD INC, www.sadd.org; Liberty Mutual Group, (800) 4 
Liberty, www.libertymutualinsurance.com.  By age 19, more than half of Americans have had 
sex, with some sources reporting that nearly 40% of 14-year-olds, 70% of twelfth graders, and 
80% of 19-year-olds have had sex. See JUST THE FACTS: ABOUT TEEN SEX, supra; 
PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTER OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY: FACTS ABOUT TEEN 
SEX, available online at http://www.realchoices.com/teenfacts.html; ASPEN EDUCATION 
GROUP, supra.  These discrepancies in percentages of sexually active teens may turn on the fact 
that many youths have adopted what I call the “Clinton definition” of sex, i.e., anything other 
than sexual intercourse, including anal sex and oral sex, is not “sex.” Professor Laumann is aware 
of this new definition of “sex.”. Laumann interview, supra  n. 15.  For example teenage and 20-
somethings will call themselves “virgins,” despite having given and received oral sex. One of the 
biggest problems with this is that some diseases, such as HPV, are transmitted through skin-to-
skin contact that occurs during non-penetrative anogenital and orogenital contact, as well as 
through sexual intercourse, and some young people believe that STDs are transmitted through 
intercourse only. The ignorance among teens and young adults is probably the root of the 
problem with the STD rate among this group.  Approximately 4 million teens contract an STD 
every year. ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2 at 4, 8. 
66 See infra nn. 67 – 72. 
67 Harrell W. Chesson, John M. Blandford, Thomas L. Gift, Guoyu Tao, & 
Kathleen L. Irwin, The Estimated Direct Cost of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Among American 
Youth, 2000, 36 Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 11 (2004)(Alan Guttmacher 
Institute).  Costs refer to direct medical and non-medical costs of treating STDs.  Direct medical 
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was estimated to be between 9.3 and 15  billion in the United States in the mid 
1990’s, adjusted to year 2000 dollars.68  This figure includes only the eight 
major STDs – HIV, HPV, HSV-2, hepatitis B, Chlamydia, gonorrhea, 
trichomoniasis, and syphilis,69 and since indirect and intangible costs were not 
included, the total cost figures are probably substantially higher.70  In 1997, 
some research indicated that the annual cost was closer to $17 billion.71  Texas 
and New York each have costs of over a billion dollars a year, while 
California’s total costs approach 2 billion.72
About 9 million young Americans, ages 15-24, contract an STD every year, 
with a total estimated burden of 6.5 billion in year 2000 dollars.73 Viral STIs, 
such as HIV, HSV-2, and HPV accounted for 94% of the total burden (6.2 
billion), while nonviral/bacterial STIs accounted for only 6% of the burden (.4 
billion).74   HIV and HPV were by far the most costly STDs in terms of total 
estimated direct medical costs, accounting for 90% of the total burden, or 5.9 
billion.75  Young people thus represent the class creating the most substantial 
economic burden in America relative to sexually transmitted diseases. 
Americans as a whole are paying the price through the cost-spreading function 
of insurance and government aid.76 And, these costs do not begin to include the 
enormous emotional and mental health costs associated with early sexual 
activity and STD infection.77
costs include costs involved with treating acute STDs and the sequelae of untreated or 
inadequately treated STDs, such as clinician visits, hospitalization, diagnostic testing, and drug 
therapy.  Direct nonmedical costs include cost of transportation to medical services.  These direct 
costs must be distinguished from indirect medical costs such as productivity losses, lost wages 
attributable to STDs, and intangible costs such as human pain and suffering; indirect medical 
costs are not included in the estimates contained herein.
68 THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra n. 6 at 7; Chesson, et al., supra n. 67  
citing, inter alia, ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2.  These costs would obviously be higher if 
expressed in current U.S. dollars.
69 For example, hepatitis C and bacterial vaginosis were excluded. Chesson, 
supra  n. 67. 
70 See Chesson et al., supra  n. 67.  
71 Chesson et al., supra  n. 67; ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2 at 25-27. 
THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra n. 27 (estimating that 7 billion results from HIV/AIDS, and 
another 10 billion a year from other STDs). 
72 ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2 at 26, Table 5. 
73 Chesson, et al, supra n. 67 at 11 – 19. 
74 ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2 at 25; Chesson, et al., supra n. 67.
75 ASHA – WHAT COST?, supra  n. 2 at 25; Chesson, et al., supra n.  67. 
76 In one study of patients receiving care for HIV, 47% were covered by 
Medicaid or Medicare, 33% had private insurance, and 20% were uninsured. W.E. Cunningham, 
et al., Prevalence and predictors of highly active antiretroviral therapy use in patients with HIV 
infection in the United States, 25 Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 115 
(2000).
77 When compared to sexually inactive teens, sexually active teens are more 
likely to be depressed (3.3 times higher for girls, 2.4 times higher for boys) and to commit suicide 
(2.8 times higher for girls, and 8.6 times higher for boys). ROBERT E. RECTOR, KIRK A. 
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C.   Who Is Spreading Sexual Diseases?
The number of sexually diseased persons in the United States could lead one to 
assume that these diseases are spread randomly throughout the population. 
However, researchers believe that this is not the case at all. A “core” group of 
sexually promiscuous people are responsible for the vast majority of new 
sexual disease cases; the vast majority of Americans never transmit a sexual 
disease to another person, even if they have one.78
The most important datum relative to the transmission of a sexual infection is 
the number of sexual partners the infected person has during an infectious 
period.79  The most current available research indicates that over 80 percent of 
Americans ages 18-59 have zero or one sex partner in any given year, 16% 
have between two and four partners, and only 3% have more than five sex 
partners.80 Age is strongly negatively correlated with number of sex partners; 
younger persons have many more sex partners than older persons.81  Of course, 
the greater number of sex partners, the greater chances of acquiring a sexual 
disease; and, once a disease is contracted, the greater the number of persons 
JOHNSON, PH.D., & LAUREN R. NOYES, SEXUALLY ACTIVE TEENAGERS ARE MORE 
LIKELY TO BE DEPRESSED AND TO COMMIT SUICIDE, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION, CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS REPORT #03-04,  available online at  
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/cda0304.cfm, relying on data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health, Wave II, 1996, which is funded by the National 
Institute of Child Health and Human Development (HICHD) and 17 other federal agencies. The 
researchers controlled for race, gender, exact age and family income and found that there was 
virtually no impact on the statistics, meaning that sexual activity appears to be the cause of the 
increased depression and attempted suicide, not confounding factors such as race or 
socioeconomic status. Not surprisingly, 66% of teens who had been sexually active expressed 
regret and wished that they had waited longer to have sex. Id., citing NATIONAL CAMPAIGN 
TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, NOT JUST ANOTHER THING TO DO: TEENS TALK 
ABOUT SEX,   REGRET, AND THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR PARENTS (June 30, 2000).
78 Laumann Interview, supra n. 15.
79 Laumann interview, supra n. 15.
80 This is the most current comprehensive data on numbers of sex 
partners per year, and probably remains accurate for Americans over age 28, who were 
18 at the time of the studies. However, considering other evidence that persons under 
age 25 are generally much more promiscuous than prior generations, disproportionately 
represent new cases of sexual disease, and were not included in this data, this data may 
not be accurate relative to this younger group of Americans. See, e.g., supra nn. 52-65 
& accompanying text. This data nonetheless demonstrates that most Americans’ sexual 
practices remain monogamous, and grossly divergent than that portrayed by television 
and other media forms. See supra n. 50. 
81 LAUMANN, et al., supra  n.  19 at 185.  To the extent that this research is 
somewhat outdated, and considering the disease rate among young persons and the fact that 
young persons have always had more partners than older persons, it is logical to conclude  that 
persons under age 30 are largely responsible for  spreading sexual diseases, and are frequently 
infecting others in the same age group. 
SEX TORTS                14
who are exposed.82 Thus, within this core group of sexually active persons, the 
risk of infection rises not arithmetically as the number of partners rises, but 
multiplicatively, i.e., not from one to two to three, but from one to four (two 
squared) to nine (three squared).83
People who have sex with people who they have known for less than a month 
are four to five times more likely to contract a sexual disease.84 People who 
have concurrent (non-monogamous) sexual partnering during some period of 
time create the greatest risk of spreading an infection if one is contracted. 
Research has found that of those persons who admitted to having two partners 
in the past year, 62% had two or more partners during at least part of the past 
year.85  For those who reported having three partners in the past year, 61% 
reported concurrent sexual relationships, and for those who had six or more 
partners in the past year, 85% reported concurrent sexual relationships.86 For 
persons with two partners in the past year that were concurrent, the length of 
time during which the person had sexual relations with both averages 2.5 
months; for those who had 6 or more partners in the past year, the period during 
which they had overlapping sexual relationships rises to 7.6 months.87 Of the 
persons who admit to having had three or more partners in the past twelve 
months, 30% stated that their partners also had three or more partners during 
the same period.88
Considering that 27% of men and 48% of women who report having had more 
than 10 partners since age 18 contract at least one STD, and 37% of men and 
55% of women who report having had 21 or more partners since age 18 
contract at least one STD, a view of who is responsible for transmitting STDs 
begins to emerge.89  When the fact that less than 3% of persons report having 
more than 5 partners in the same year,90 young persons who have not yet 
82 Id., Chapter 11. 
83 Laumann interview, supra n. 15.
84 LAUMANN, et al, supra n. 19  at 421, Table. 11.15. 
85 Id.  at 183, Table 5.2.
86 Id.  
87 Id.
88 Id.  at 404.  
89 The type of disease also plays a role in how easy it is to transmit. For 
example, bacterial infections are transmissible following a short incubation period and are no 
longer communicable after treatment.  People with bacterial infections such as chlamydia and 
gonorrhea are usually infectious for about a month if they have symptoms, and about four months 
if they are asymptomatic. Id.  at 424.  The bacterial infections are generally the highly 
transmissible STDs. Id.  at 424.  Viral STDs cannot be cured, and persons infected with these can 
be infected for years rather than months after being exposed. For example, AIDS can be 
transmitted continuously by the infected person, while genital herpes and warts are intermittently 
transmissible, which usually is during outbreaks or other symptoms of the disease. Id. at 424.  
90 Id. at 184.
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married have the greatest number of partners,91 and younger persons have more 
partners than similarly situated persons in prior generations,92 it becomes clear 
that there exists a “core” group of individuals who are responsible for the 
continued reproduction of several highly infectious (mostly bacterial) STDs, 
meaning that these people spread the infection to at least one other person 
before they are no longer infectious.93  Other research has shown that persons 
with viral STDs have at least as many sexual partners, if not more, than persons 
who have never been infected with an STD, and that persons with viral STDs 
do not moderate their sexual contact with others in any appreciable way.94  In 
addition, persons with a history of both bacterial and viral infections report 
having sex more frequently (gauged as number of sex acts per week) than those 
who have never been infected.95 Finally, persons with prior viral infections, in 
particular the youngest group ages 18-29, use condoms during vaginal 
intercourse far less often than those with no prior STDs.96 Thus, while the 
consistent use of condoms can control the transmission of a variety of STDs,97
they are not being used by some of the most  sexually irresponsible members of 
society.98
Although core group members often transmit diseases to other core group 
members, they also connect with non-core group members, passing sexual 
diseases to the general public.99 Due to the nature of infectious antigens’ need 
91 Id. at 178, 208, Tables 5.1B & 5.9A.
92 Id. at 204, Table 5.7.
93 Id. at 425 (citations omitted.)
94 Id. at 425. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.   Note that the proportion of persons studied with  HIV/AIDS was very 
small and combined with persons infected with other viral STDs.  It is possible that persons with 
HIV/AIDS behave differently than those with other viral infections such as genital herpes, 
considering the gravity of harm imposed by HIV/AIDS. 
97 Id.  at 422, Table 11.23. There have been a few studies about actual condom 
use. Younger persons are much more likely to use condoms than older persons. Id. at  426, Table 
11.24B.  Young persons demonstrate less trust that a sexual partner will not transmit a disease.  
The researchers asked whether respondents agreed with the statement, “You don’t need to use a 
condom if you know your partner well.” 74% of respondents ages 18-24 disagreed, while 59 
percent overall disagreed.  Id.   at 430. Perhaps ironically, the persons who have had fewer sexual 
partners were less trusting that a partner will not give them a disease. Or, perhaps their level of 
caution is the reason that they have had fewer sex partners. Id. at 430-431.  Persons who have 
never had a STD are more likely to use condoms than those who have been infected with a viral 
STI. Id. at 426, Table 11.24B.
98 Among persons who have had sex with four or more other persons in the last 
year, condom use never exceeds 30.8% other than in one-night stand situations, in which condom 
use rises to between 59% and 63%. Id. at 418-9, 421, Tables 11.21 and 11.22.  Note that this was 
the category with the greatest number of reported partners in the last year in this study, so this 
category includes persons who have sex with 20, 30, or even more partners per year, that is, the 
riskiest group of individuals. 
99 Id.  However, since the non-core group members usually are not engaged in 
concurrent sexual relationships, they rarely transmit the disease to any other person.  Id.
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for new bodies to stay in circulation, if the 3% of Americans100 who represent 
the core group were to stop transmitting diseases, all sexually transmitted 
diseases would die out when all infected persons died; thus, some 
epidemiologists believe that 3% of Americans may be responsible for 100% of 
sexual disease perpetration.101  Even if these figures are not exact, there is no 
question that a small, core group of Americans is responsible for the vast 
majority of new STD cases. 
Effective policies to slow the spread of sexual disease must focus on how to 
educate and deter this core group.  The best legal policy would consider how 
liability rules impact sexual choices, particularly among American youth, to 
discourage socially destructive sexual behavior and to expose and create 
healthier sexual norms. Considering the tight social networks within which core 
group members circulate, and the fact that even minor modifications to core 
group members’ sexual practices (e.g., consistent condom usage) would 
seriously reduce the risk of most disease transmission, it seems fair to conclude 
that a small number of judgments – word of which would spread fast -- could 
have a big impact on the overall rate of sexual disease transmission. 
III.  HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SEX TORT JURISPRUDENCE
“The history of man indicates that as soon as he created the relationship of 
marriage, adultery was not far behind.”102
This section will first briefly review the history of American law and sexuality 
and posit that tort law’s fairly recent retreat from regulating sexual misconduct 
has fostered irresponsible sexual behavior, which has contributed to the current 
sexual disease epidemic. Next, this section will review current sex tort law, 
arguing that the current law is failing to meet its goals of deterrence, 
compensation, and protection of individuals’ health. 
100 Three percent of Americans include a larger percent of persons under age 25, 
and a much smaller percent of persons over age 45, who are generally married and so “exit” the 
sexual market. Laumann Interview, supra n.  15. 
101 Laumann Interview, supra n.  15.  Professor Laumann related to me that this 
is the assertion of epidemiologists who model disease spread in large populations with the 
assumption of random mixing. This is thus a theoretically derived conclusion grounded in 
random mixing model theories. Empirical confirmation of the validity of such theories is 
ongoing, and may never be proven, considering that it is unlikely that core disease perpetrators 
will stop spreading diseases altogether. 
102 Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Laws on Adultery – A Synopsis, 1 J. Fam. L. 89, 
89 (1961). 
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A.  Sexual Behavior And The Law: 
A Brief History 
“Amatory torts . . . have been abolished. . . . ‘The derisive term ‘heartbalm” 
attached to the breach of promise action is an indication that public policy no 
longer considers money damages appropriate for what is perceived as only an 
ordinary broken heart’.”103
Regulation of sexual conduct can be traced to ancient law, and such regulation 
has been a constant throughout history.  Most of the ancient laws relating to 
sexual impropriety dealt with adultery.104 Most American states still have 
criminal statutes on the books providing for punishment of adultery, but 
criminal prosecutions are virtually non-existent.105
The American tort system historically has actively deterred other socially 
undesirable sexual conduct. In the latter party of the 19th century, actions for 
seduction were among the most common forms of civil actions, and were 
usually successful.106 Prior to the 1930’s, American courts entertained actions 
for alienation of affections,107 criminal conversation,108 seduction,109 and breach 
103 Conley v. Romeri, 60 Mass.App.Ct 799, 806 N.E.2d 933, 805, n.5 (2004).
104 Ancient punishment for adultery included being eaten alive by dogs, death of 
both parties, bodily mutilation of the adulterer, and, in ancient Rome, giving both the husband 
and the father the “right” to kill the guilty parties. See Comment, Fanning An Old Flame: 
Alienation of Affections And Criminal Conversation Revisited, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 61, 65 & nn. 29-
33 (1999). See also William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal To Prevent Adultery And 
Save Families: Two Old Torts Looking For A New Career, 33 Ariz. St. L. J. 985, 1002-3 (2001). 
English common law considered adultery to be a tort, not a crime, and allowed the husband of an 
adulterous wife to sue his wife’s lover for money damages in a criminal conversation lawsuit. See 
Comment, supra at 65. Early American Puritans forced adulterers to wear a scarlet “A” in lieu of 
death as punishment for adultery. See Comment, supra  at 65 & n. 37.
105 See Comment, supra n. 104 at 65-66. However, recent criminal seduction 
convictions relative to minors have been recorded as recently at 1988. See People v. Bayless, 
2004 WL 2341477 (Cal.)(defendant had been convicted of seduction of a minor in 1988). 
Amburgey v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1967)(seduction victim was under age 21.) 
See also Dan Subotnik, “Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do To Me? I Love You”: A Disquisition 
On Law, Sex, and Talk, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 311, 324 (1995). 
106 Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 
Deceit”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 374, 383-4 (1993).   
107 Alienation of affections is where a third party’s interference destroyed the 
affection that existed between spouses prior to the interference This tort was known as 
“enticement” in English common law, and could be brought against any meddling third party, 
even without sexual involvement, such as mothers in law.  Some scholars assert that alienation of 
affections did not evolve from enticement. See Comment, supra n. 104 at 66-67. 
108 This tort involved a third party’s adulterous relationship with plaintiff’s 
spouse. This tort was a strict liability tort, as there were no real defenses such as the spouse living 
apart from her spouse and representing herself to be unmarried.  This tort was known as 
“seduction” in English common law.  See Comment, supra n. 104 at 66-68. 
109 Seduction went through some changes in American law, and this tort was 
codified in many states beginning in Iowa in 1851, and allowed women to sue in their own name 
SEX TORTS                18
of marriage promise.110  What bound these 4 “heartbalm” torts together was 
their common focus on legal redress for emotional and reputation injury 
resulting from sexual misconduct; disease control was not the issue.111
During the latter half of the twentieth century, heartbalm torts were eviscerated, 
based essentially on the concepts that public policy does not support civil 
redress for broken hearts, and women who brought heartbalm actions were 
abusing men through the civil court system.  Early feminists who sought 
freedom from paternalistic laws and obsolete common law conceptions of 
women as property of men112 fueled the first anti-heartbalm movement as part 
of the first American sex revolution that began in the 1930’s.113  Indiana’s 
enactment of the “Act To Promote Public Morals” initiated the movement, 
abolishing all of the heartbalm torts.114 Other states quickly proposed similar 
legislation, and much of the rhetoric surrounding the new legislation was 
misogynistic, focusing on the “golddiggers” who blackmailed money from men 
through sex tort vehicles.115 Yet, although 23 states considered anti-heartbalm 
legislation in 1935, only 8 states had passed such legislation by 1950.116
A second wave of anti-heartbalm legislation coalesced with the “second” 
American sexual revolution of the 1960’s.117  This period, of course, involved a 
for damages resulting from the devastating social injury that resulted at that time from premarital 
sex or unwed motherhood.  See Larson, supra  n. 106 at 385-6. 
110 Larson, supra n. 106 at 394 & n. 85. 
111 Larson, supra n. 106 at 394 & n. 85. 
112 All of these torts originated from the concept that women were property, 
which is why fathers and husbands had the right to sue the men who took sexual advantage of 
their daughters/wives, as this was an interference with their property rights, and loss of the 
woman’s services to the plaintiff.  See, Larson, supra n. 106 at 382-3.  See also W. PROSSER, 
LAW OF TORTS 875 (4th ed. 1971)(regarding criminal conversation and the fact that a wife’s 
consent did not destroy the husband’s action, since wife was considered property: “it was 
considered that she [the wife] was no more capable of giving consent which would prejudice the 
husband’s interest than would his horse,” citing 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 430 (2d ed. 1937). 
113 See, e.g., Subotnik, supra n. 105 at 320-321.  Ironically, the arguments that 
fueled the movement away from heartbalm torts were hardly consistent with the view that women 
were independent, competent people who did not need the law’s protection.  Instead, the main 
arguments in support of the anti-heartbalm movement centered on women’s alleged misuse of the 
torts to extort money from men, with newspaper articles calling plaintiffs in these cases 
“golddiggers” and “blackmailers” who used the heartbalm torts as tools for extortion. Larson, 
supra n. 106 at 394-6. 
114 See Corbett, supra n. 104 at 1007-8; 1935 IND. ACTS, Ch. 208 Sec. 1 
(codified at IND. CODE. ANN. Sec. 2-508) (Burns 1946 replacement volume). 
115 See, e.g., Larson, supra n.  106 at 394-400, 445-448; Corbett, supra n. 104 at 
1007-1010. 
116 See Corbett, supra n. 104 at 1008 & nn. 100-103. 
117 Although most people think of the American Sexual Revolution as a 1960’s  
phenomenon, from a sociological and legislative standpoint, it is really the second wave of a 
sexual revolution that began in the 1930’s when Victorian concepts were rejected by early 
feminists, and female power and sexual expression became more socially acceptable. In addition, 
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sweeping rejection of traditional American values.  Traditional beliefs about 
sexual morality and gender roles were abandoned, as more women moved from 
the home into the workforce and, perhaps above all, women gained substantial 
control over their reproductive function by the development of the birth control 
pill.118  No doubt spurred in part by the release of the Kinsey reports,119 and the 
popularization of pornography through publications such as Playboy,120 sex 
the 1960’s Sexual Revolution probably began no later than 1953 when Kinsey’s second report 
and Playboy magazine came out, as these items caused people to reassess sexual norms. 
118 At least some scholars believe that this control over childbirth ushered in an 
“era of liberated sexual practices, where openness and sexual freedom would reign.” EDWARD 
A. WYNNE & KEVIN RYAN, RECLAIMING OUR SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK ON 
TEACHING CHARACTER, ACADEMICS, AND DISCIPLINE 225-6  (2d ed. 1997).
119 In 1948 and 1953, respectively, Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues published 
the first “scientific” data regarding male and female sexuality. See ALFRED C. KINSEY, 
WARDELL B. POMEROY & CLYDE MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN 
MALE (1948) and ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY & CLYDE MARTIN, 
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953). Despite serious methodological 
flaws, the most serious of which related to the unrepresentative sexual nature of the subjects of 
the study, who did not reflect most Americans’ sexual behavior, but were volunteers who 
probably engaged in different sexual behavior than persons not interested in volunteering to 
discuss their sexuality, and consisted of “a fraternity here, a college class there, a PTA from a 
third place, and a group of homosexual men from somewhere else,” the Kinsey reports were 
widely read and “shocked the nation and became enshrined as the nation’s report card on sexual 
behavior.” See ROBERT T. MICHAEL, JOHN  H. GAGNON, EDWARD O. LAUMANN & 
GINA KOLATA, SEX IN AMERICA 15- 20 (1994).  The reports stated that 90% of men and 
50% of women had premarital sex, that almost all men and 3/5 of women masturbated, and that 
50% of men had extramarital sex, inter alia, which was very disturbing to Americans and may 
have contributed to the increased sexuality of Americans thereafter,  based on the view that 
everyone else was doing it. Ironically, the Kinsey reports have been largely rejected by the 
scientific community on account of gross scientific flaws, yet appear to have had a great impact 
on Americans’ conception about the contents of normal, appropriate, ubiquitous sexual practices 
in America. Indeed, Kinsey is reported to have encouraged pedophiles to sexually violate 
“between 317 and 2035 infants and children,” to have been involved in a variety of perverse 
sexual practices, and ultimately, to have died as a result of “orchitis,” a lethal infection of the 
testicles that results from masochistic masturbation (whatever that is). See Judith A. Reisman, 
Crafting Bi/Homosexual Youth, 14 Regent U. L. Rev. 283, 312 (2001-2002).  Kinsey has been 
dubbed a scientific fraud bent on propagating and encouraging his own perverse sexual ideals. Id.  
Perhaps worse, Kinsey’s inaccurate data, and the resultant societal reaction may have contributed 
greatly to the rise of sexual disease in America, as behavioral research shows that people’s 
perceptions of what others are doing impacts their own choices, and can alter norms. See infra
Sec. IV.B.2.  What is clear is that prior to Kinsey’s publications, the only common sexually 
transmitted diseases were gonorrhea and syphilis, both bacterial, and both easily treatable with 
antibiotics, but now, the sexual disease epidemic involves so many incurable, viral antigens that 
they cannot even be counted accurately.  See supra Sec. II.A.  
120 The first edition of Playboy came out in December of 1953, the same year 
Kinsey’s second report was released. Seventy thousand copies of the first Playboy edition were 
printed, and over 54,000 sold, at fifty cents per copy, no doubt in large part because Marilyn 
Monroe was the centerfold. On the first issue’s first page, Hugh Hefner wrote, “We believe too, 
that we are filling a publishing need only slightly less important than the one just taken care of by 
the Kinsey Report.” There was no date on the original issue of Playboy, as Hefner did not know 
if the magazine would sell, and whether a second edition would be financially feasible. For the 
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came out of the closet and into the streets, and consensual sex outside of 
marriage, masturbation, cohabitation, birth control, and even abortion became  
more accepted.121 “Free love” sentiment and bumper stickers were ubiquitous. 
The only practical consequences of adultery or other irresponsible or deceptive 
sexual behavior were a lover’s contempt, and possibly a relatively benign, 
curable sexual disease.122
During the sexual revolution of the 1960’s, feminist sex reformers sought to 
advance women’s rights by reshaping law’s regulation of sex,123 and a new 
wave of anti-heartbalm movement ensued.  This time, it was very successful.124
Today, no more than 9 states recognize alienation of affections or criminal 
conversation.125   Seduction has been abolished by statute in all but 17 states, 
and 21 states have interpreted their anti-heartbalm statutes to prohibit breach of 
promise actions.126
Judicial sentiment surrounding the second wave of the anti-heartbalm 
movement revealed the sexual revolution’s apparent impact on American 
norms. Courts expressed the view that the heartbalm torts “diminished human 
dignity” by airing such matters in the courts, and that the prevalence (and 
apparent societal acceptance) of extramarital affairs could clog the court system 
with vexatious litigation if such torts were allowed.127 In turn, the message to 
same reason, Hefner’s name does not appear on the first edition, for fear that if it failed, he’d 
have trouble getting another publishing job. See www.Playboy.com. 
121 Anita L. Allen, Privacy And The Public Official: Talking About Sex As A 
Dilemma For Democracy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1165, 1176 (1999). More generally, social 
institutions and customs were intensely scrutinized, and rejected, as a part of the Vietnam War 
protest movement and civil rights struggle.
122 In 1950, the only common sexual diseases were gonorrhea and syphilis, 
which were bacterial and curable.  See infra, Sec. II.A. Divorce law underwent radical changes as  
the “no fault” divorce trend, beginning in Washington state in 1973, spread fast, so there were no 
economic consequences for adultery leading to divorce. See HARRY D. DRAUSE, LINDA D. 
ELROD, MARSHAGARRISON & J. THOMAS OLDHAM, FAMILY LAW 2 (5th Ed. 2003).  
Prior to no-fault divorce, adultery was grounds for divorce and often diminished substantially the 
adulterer’s property rights in the divorce settlement. See, Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A 
Review of the Year in Family Law: State Courts React to Troxel, 35 Fam. L. Q. 577 (2002). 
However, a few states continue to bar alimony altogether when the claimant spouse is found 
guilty of adultery  causing divorce.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. Sec. 19-6-1. 
123 As part of this movement, rape laws were also changed to protect women, 
such as by eliminating the marital exception to rape, and sexual harassment laws followed.  See, 
e.g., Larson, supra n. 106 at 400-401.
124 See Corbett, supra n. 104 at 1009 – 1010. 
125 Corbett, supra n. 104 at 1009 & n. 7.
126 See Subotnik, supra n. 105 at 321-2. 
127 See Feldman v. Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 36 (1984); Comment, supra n. 104 at 
72-73; Norton v. MacFarlane, 818 P.2d. 8, 12 (Utah 1991), where the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that allegations of sexual misconduct “no longer carry a significant stigma.” 
SEX TORTS                21
society was that the law was not concerned about sexual misconduct,128
including adultery,129 in part because sex tort law was focused on broken hearts 
and injury to dignity, not deadly diseases. The absence of legal sanctions for 
sexual misconduct,130 and resulting contemporary belief among some 
Americans that they owe nothing to their sexual partners, failed to discourage 
sexual promiscuity,131 which has contributed to the sexual disease epidemic. 
Tort law’s current message to society regarding sexuality is clearly “caveat 
emptor.”132
B.  Sex Torts Today
“Plaintiff’s claim is clearly barred . . . .  The very illegal act to which the 
plaintiff consented [premarital sex] . . . produced the injuries and damages of 
which she complains [genital herpes].  And, the foregoing principle [illegal acts 
128 At least one legal scholar has argued that Lorena Bobbit’s self-help decision
to remove her husband’s penis while he slept resulted in part from a lack of legal remedies. See
Gretchen Reynolds, A Breach of Promise, Chi.Mag. 114 (April, 1994),  quoting Northwestern 
University Law Professor Jane E. Larson. In 1997, a North Carolina jury ordered a husband’s 
adulterous lover to pay his wife one million dollars after deciding that the husband’s secretary 
lured him away from his wife and family. See Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App 
.1999), rev. den. 514 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999), appeal dismissed, 542 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 2000); 
Terry Carter, “She Done Me Wrong”: A Jury Agrees, Awarding a Jilted Wife $1 Million in an 
Alienation of Affection Suit Against the “Other Woman” ABA J. Oct. 1997 at  24.  In an 
interview with Dateline NBC, jurors stated that they wanted to send a message about marriage 
and morality, and make clear that “homewreckers” were wrong. Dateline NBC (NBC television 
broadcast, Dec. 15, 1997) described the case pursued by Dorothy Hutelmyer against her 
husband’s secretary a “symbol for the prevailing thoughts about marriage and relationships in this 
area.” The secretary-defendant later stated that, in retrospect, she would not have dated Joe 
Hutelmyer under the circumstances, and would have waited until he was divorced before 
seducing him. Dateline, supra. This is contrary to one court’s opinion that in matters of sex, risk 
of damages would not be a deterrent. See, Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994).
129 A high percentage of Americans say that adultery is wrong, and in fact more 
Americans say so today than in the 1970s (around 85%,), yet when asked if they thought less of a 
person who they knew had committed adultery, only about 60% said they lost esteem for that 
person. In a 1998 CNN/Time poll, 86% of Americans responded that adultery was wrong, 
compared with 76% in 1977. See ALLPOLITICS, HOW DO AMERICANS VIEW 
ADULTERY? Available online at 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/20/adultery/poll; Bruce Handy, How We Really 
Feel About Fidelity, TIME, Aug 31, 1998. 
130 This has lead one legal commentator to conclude, “The current lack of 
penalties for adultery and interference with family relationships is shockingly new.” See
Comment, supra  n.  104 at 65. 
131
“Promiscuity” is not intended to carry a moral connotation but means 
“characterized by a lack of discrimination; specif., engaging in sexual intercourse 
indiscriminately, or with many persons.”  Webster’s New World Dictionary 1076 (1988). 
132 See Larson, supra n. 106 at 413: “Ironically, the principle of caveat emptor 
remains most vigorously alive in the sexual marketplace.”
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bar recovery in tort] applies even though defendant concealed his infection 
from the plaintiff.”133
The sexual disease epidemic necessitates a reassessment of tort law’s proper 
function in sexual relations, as a new wave of sex tort litigation – seeking 
damages for sexual disease transmission -- has been growing over the past 20 
years and will likely continue to grow commensurate with the proliferation of 
sexual disease. Although a few states have recognized negligent transmission of 
sexual disease since the late 19th to early 20th century, 134 courts all over the 
United States are addressing the issue of whether civil liability is appropriate 
133 Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 35, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Va. 1990) This case was 
essentially overruled based on the Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) .  See Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. Jan. 14, 2005). 
134 Tort recovery for the negligent transmission of a contagious disease, such as 
whooping cough, has existed in the United States since the latter part of the nineteenth century.
See, e.g., Kliegel v. Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 69 N.W. 67 (1896) (typhoid fever); Smith v. Baker, 20 
F. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1884) (whooping cough); Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 23 N.W. 632 
(1885) (smallpox).  See also Franklin v. Butcher, 144 Mo.App. 660, 129 S.W. 428 (1910) 
(smallpox); Hendricks v. Butcher, 144 Mo.App. 671, 129 S.W. 431 (1910) (smallpox); Skillings 
v. Allen, 143 Minn 323, 326, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (1919) (scarlet fever); Earle v. Kuklo, 26 
N.J.Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953) (tuberculosis); Kowalske v. Armour & Co., 300 Minn. 301, 
305, 220 N.W.2d 268, 271 (1974) (brucellosis). Tort liability, and even criminal sanctions,  for 
transmitting a sexual disease to another person has also been recognized for nearly a century,
Transmission of a sexual disease has constituted a crime in some states since the early 20th
century. See, e.g., State v. Lankford, 29 Del. 594, 102 A. 63, 64 
(DEL.GEN.SESS.1917)(syphilis); 63 OKL.ST.ANN. Sec. 1-519 (63 O.S. 1991 Sec. 1 -519), 
formerly 63 OKL.ST.ANN. Sec. 543 (1921). Tort liability has also been recognized for sexual 
disease transmission in some states since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See White v. 
Nellis, 31 N.Y. 405 (1865)  (venereal disease); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206, 
208 (1920) (unspecified venereal disease); DeVall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245, 246-247 
(Tex.Civ.App.1936) (crabs). but disease has not been the focus of sex tort law until fairly 
recently, a result of the sexual disease epidemic. See, e.g., Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 
314, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1988) (venereal disease); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 105-6 
(Minn.Ct.App.1988) (herpes); Maharam v. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1986) 
(herpes); M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (herpes); Berner v. Caldwell, 
543 So.2d 686 (Ala.1989) (genital herpes); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal.Rptr. 273, 150 
Cal.App.3d 992 (1984) (herpes); Long v. Adams, 175 Ga.App. 538, 333 S.E.2d 852 (1985) 
(genital herpes); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. Banc 1986) (herpes); McPherson v. 
McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (1998) (Human Papilloma Virus [HPV]); Roe v. Doe, 218 
Cal.App.3d 1538, 267 Cal.Rptr. 564 (1990) (genital herpes); Meany v. Meany, 639 So.2d 229 
(La.1994) (genital herpes); Cerniglia v. LeVasseur, 1995 WL 500673 (Conn.Super.1995) (genital 
herpes – third party) (unpublished opinion); G.L. v. M.L., 228 N.J.Super 566, 550 A.2d 525 
(1988) (genital herpes); Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074 (1997)(herpes); Plaza v. Estate of 
Wisser, 211 A.D.2d 111, 626 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1995)(AIDS); Schenk v. Devall, 205 A.D.2d 900, 
613 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1994)(herpes); Desideri v. Brown, 184 A.D.2d 247, 584 N.Y.S.2d 815 
(1992)(venereal disease); Tischler v. Dimenna, 160 Misc.2d 525, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002 
(1994)(AIDS); Doe v. Roe, 157 Misc.2d 690, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1993)(Chlamydia); Duke v. 
Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo) cert. den., 444 U.S. 863, 100 S.Ct. 132, 62 L.Ed.2d 86 (1979) 
(gonorrhea).
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for sexual disease transmission as one of “first impression.”135  Courts are 
grappling for liability standards in sex torts cases while holding tight to anti-
heartbalm sentiment, which has resulted in sex tort jurisprudence that is unclear 
and unpredictable, thereby failing to meet tort law’s goals of deterrence, 
education, and compensation relative to a very serious public health threat.136
Although sexual disease cases are almost always brought as negligence actions, 
courts have also recognized sex torts grounded in fraud, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and battery where the plaintiff contracted a sexual 
disease.137  This section argues that negligence and intentional tort theories do 
not further social policy in sexual disease transmission cases.
1. Negligence Theory
“[P]ersons who engage in unprotected sex, at a time of the prevalence of 
sexually transmitted diseases, including some that are fatal, assume the risk of 
contracting such diseases. Both parties in an intimate relationship have a duty 
to protect themselves. When one ventures out in the rain without an umbrella, 
should they complain when they get wet?”138
This quote expresses a typical judicial attitude towards sexual disease 
transmission: while the prevalence of the public health threat is recognized, the 
attitude toward persons foolish enough to contract a sexual disease trumps solid 
public policy analysis. Opinions such as this shame the victim, and allow sexual 
disease perpetrators to pay no regard to others’ health. Since the date of this 
opinion, tens of millions of Americans have contracted sexual diseases.139
135 See, e.g., McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1045, 1998 ME 141 
(1998)(“Turning to [plaintiff’s] novel theory of negligence, we must first determine whether a 
negligence action may be based on the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease, an issue of 
first impression in Maine”); B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988)(Maryland court 
certified question from District Court: Does Maryland recognize a cause of action for either 
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or negligence resulting from the sexual 
transmission of a dangerous, contagious, and incurable disease, such as genital herpes?  Court 
answered in the affirmative.)
136 Some states are still in the process of abolishing heartbalm torts. See, e.g.,
Neal v. Neal, 125 Idaho 617, 873 P.2d 871 (2004)(finding that Idaho no longer recognizes 
criminal conversation). 
137 A few cases have also recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
but these usually involve fear of contracting AIDS and are generally analyzed consistent with 
toxic tort cases/fear of future disease. See, e.g., Tischler v. Lawson, 160 Misc.2d 525, 609 
N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1994). 
138 See Doe v. Roe, 157 Misc.2d 690, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678, 694 (1993)(emphasis in 
original).
139 See supra Sec. II.A.
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Sexual disease transmission cases rely almost exclusively on negligence 
theory,140 a fault-based tort which is unpredictable, inefficient, and often 
extremely embarrassing for the parties involved in sex tort cases. Although all 
contemporary courts that have dealt with the issue have found that it is possible 
to state a claim for negligent transmission of a sexual disease, the current 
negligence paradigm has been proven to create prohibitively expensive and 
embarrassing fact-specific litigation and the attendant problem of very 
uncertain liability, which fails to deter irresponsible sexual conduct. Primarily,
judges seem reluctant to establish a clear duty of care relative to sexual 
activity,141 instead adopting a case by case inquiry to determine whether a duty 
to protect a sexual partner from a sexual disease should exist. 142  In addressing 
the question of duty, courts have focused on the nature of the parties’ 
relationship, and whether defendant knew or should have known of his disease, 
to establish the foreseeability of infecting others.143  An Oklahoma decision is 
140 See, e.g., Michele L. Mekel, Kiss And Tell: Making The Case For The 
Tortious Transmission Of Herpes And Human Papilloma Virus, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 929, 938 (Fall 
2001). Negligent conduct is conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to a person to 
whom a duty of due care is owed, and is generally stated upon prima facie proof of five elements: 
duty, breach, harm, cause in fact, and proximate cause.
141 One court noted that persons with sexual diseases are in the best position to 
control the spread of the disease. R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
142 Although some courts have found that a duty to avoid infecting others always 
exists where defendant knows of his disease, defendants often do not know, or claim that they do 
not know, about their disease, and if a court believes this, they will find no duty based on no 
foreseeability. See, e.g., Roe v. Doe, 218 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1544 (1990) (“Ordinarily, 
foreseeability is a question of fact . . . . The degree of foreseeability necessary to warrant the 
finding of a duty will . . . vary from case to case.”)  The case by case nature of the duty inquiry 
has resulted in different ways of proving breach once a duty is recognized.  Breach of the duty 
has been established by carelessly exposing others to infection, see, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 
So.2d 686, 689 (Ala.1989); or carelessly failing to obtain a diagnosis and treatment where 
defendant claims he was unaware of the infection, see, e.g., M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 
(Minn.Ct.App. 1991)(man without actual knowledge of herpes infection held to a duty of care to 
warn sexual partner about possible infection, where man had recurring genital sores and medical 
advice that they may be herpes.) Where the disease involved has obvious symptoms, so 
defendant’s knowledge of the disease can be readily established, breach has been based on failure 
to inform a sexual partner, Roe v. Doe, 218 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1542 (1990)(herpes); failure to put 
on a condom, Id. (defendant unsuccessfully argued that since at the time that he infected plaintiff 
the possibility of herpes transmission without lesions (asymptomatic shedding) was not well 
known, even to the medical community, that he could not be faulted for believing that he could 
not transmit it during a period when he did not have visible lesions; the court found that 
asymptomatic shedding was known and that in any event, failure to warn was not acceptable);  
and failure to abstain from sex, see Tort Liability For Sexually Transmitted Diseases, supra  n. 2 
at n. 17. 
143 See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 218 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1543-4, 267 Cal.Rptr. 564, 566-
7 (1990)(“In determining whether a duty should be imposed, the courts are guided by the basic 
principle . . . that everyone is responsible for injury occasioned to another by his own want of 
ordinary care or skill.   . . .  a number of policy considerations [should be balanced], including the 
foreseeability of the harm suffered, the degree of certainty the plaintiff suffered injury, the 
closeness of the connection between defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral 
blame attached to the defendant’s conduct and the consequences to the community of imposing a 
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representative of the unpredictable nature of the duty inquiry: “The length and 
nature of the parties’ relationship, its degree of intimacy, and [defendant’s] 
knowledge of her condition are all factors to consider in order to determine 
whether [defendant’s] conduct created  . . . a duty to lessen the risk or take 
precautions to protect others. . . .”144
The unclear duty standard that has emerged in sexual disease cases145 has 
caused defendants to make numerous arguments that no duty is owed to a 
duty to exercise care.  . . . in cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high 
degree of foreseeability may be required. On the other hand, in cases where there are strong 
policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser 
degree of foreseeability may be required. . . .  [In the case of herpes], it is beyond question that 
our state’s policy of preventing the spread of venereal disease is great and that the burden of 
warning a prospective sex partner is small. Thus, only a slight degree of foreseeability was 
needed to warrant the imposition of a duty of care in the present case [of herpes transmission].”  
See also R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 106-7 (1988)(“Minnesota courts have long 
recognized that the preservation of public health is a matter of great public importance. Legal 
duties and rules must therefore be designed, wherever possible, to help prevent the spread of 
dangerous, communicable diseases,” citing  Skillings v Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 326, 173 N.W. 
663, 664 (1919)); Cerniglia v. LeVasseur, 1995 WL 500673 (Conn.Super.)(persons with a 
venereal disease have a duty to use reasonable care to avoid infecting others with whom they 
engage in sexual conduct);  McPherson v.McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1998)(defendant 
cannot be liable for negligent transmission of the Human Papilloma Virus to his wife where trial 
court found that he did not know or have reason to know that he had it at the time he infected his 
wife; absent foreseeability, defendant cannot be found to have breached a duty of care); M.M.D. 
v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 (Minn.Ct.App. 1991)(a reasonable person with recurring sores on 
genitals, who was told by a doctor that he should be tested for herpes, should know of the 
potential to infect others, and therefore has a duty to avoid sexual contact with others, or at least 
to inform them about his disease and his doctor’s advice). 
144 Smith v. Speligene, 990 P.2d 312, 315-6 (1999). This case involved Herpes 
Simplex I, which plaintiff alleged he contracted from his former girlfriend. The court utilized 
zone of risk analysis. Although the case does not indicate which part of his body was infected, 
HSVI is usually related to lip herpes, but can be transmitted to other body parts and can be 
painful.  All herpes viruses are incurable. See also B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 153, 538 A.2d 
1175 (1988)(an “ongoing intimate boyfriend-girlfriend relationship” may give rise to a 
confidential relationship creating a duty to disclose a disease, but finding no confidential 
relationship required because there is always a “general tort duty” to disclose sexual disease 
before engaging in intercourse.)
145 See, e.g., R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn.Ct.App. 1988)(“The 
scope of the duty of care which we recognize here will necessarily vary depending on the facts of 
individual cases. As one commentator has noted, the three words, “I have herpes” will be 
sufficient in most cases to give fair notice of the danger of infection, and to fulfill the duty to use 
reasonable care to avoid transmitting the disease. Whether the duty to take reasonable precaution 
to avoid transmission of herpes has been breached is a question of fact for the trial court or jury, 
as is the question of whether the breach of duty proximately caused injury to the plaintiff”); 
Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ohio 1989)(The general principle is well established 
that a person who negligently exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease, which such 
other thereby contracts, is liable for damages therefore . . . .  The degree of diligence required to 
prevent exposing another to a contagious or infectious disease depends on the character of the 
disease and the danger of communicating it to others.)  At least one court has held that the key 
issues are the degree of contact, rather than its nature, sexual or otherwise, and the defendant’s 
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sexual partner, such as: that no duty exists to disclose sexual disease to a sexual 
partner prior to sex, 146 that no duty exists to the spouse of a paramour,147 that 
no duty exists absent a confirmed diagnosis of the disease,148 that no duty exists 
to disclose extramarital sexual relations to one’s spouse absent knowledge of 
having contracted a disease,149 and that past promiscuous behavior within a 
group at high risk for contracting AIDS, without knowledge of having 
contracted AIDS, does not give rise to a duty to warn.150  These arguments have 
been entertained, and have met with some success, on account of unclear legal 
standards.151 Indeed, although the claim that a husband owes his wife no duty to 
knowledge of his contagious disease, so that wrestler owed other wrestler duty based on 
defendants knowledge of his herpes blisters and the degree of skin-to-skin contact inherent in 
wrestling. See Silver v. Levittown Union Free School Dist., 692 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887-8, 180 
Misc.2d 1015, 1016-7 (1999). 
146 See, e.g., R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 106 (1988); Smith v. Walker, 11 
Pa.D.& C. 4th 663, 664 (Ct.Common Pleas Penn 1991); B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 151, 538 
A.2d 1175 (1988).
147 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Okla.1997); Cerniglia v. 
LeVasseur, 1995 WL 500673 (Conn.Super)(unpublished case).  Both cases held that a paramour 
may be liable to the spouse of his or her sexual partner provided that it was foreseeable that the 
disease could be transmitted to the spouse (i.e., the paramour knows of the marriage, as sex 
between spouses was held foreseeable) and no superseding cause exists (i.e., the paramour’s sex 
partner was not informed of the disease at the time he or she gave it to his or her spouse; if the 
paramours sex partner was informed, the negligence or intentional misconduct in failing to 
inform the spouse constitutes a superseding cause.)
148 See Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D.Mich. 1993).
149 See In Re Marriage of J.T., 77 Wash. App. 361, 891 P.2d 729 (1995) (no duty 
between spouses to disclose extramarital sexual relationships); McPherson v. McPherson, 712 
A.2d 1043, 1044-5 (no duty to be sexually faithful in a marriage). But see SAV v. KGV, 108 
S.W.2d 651 (Mo.Sup.Ct. en banc 1986)(duty of care owed by one spouse to other spouse can be 
assessed, defined, and adjusted by courts). 
150 Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D.Mich. 1993).  In Johnson, the court 
limited the duty to warn a sexual partner about the possibility of contracting AIDS only where the 
defendant: 1) has actual knowledge that he is HIV positive; 2) has experienced symptoms 
associated with HIV; or 3) has actual knowledge that a prior sex partner has been diagnosed as 
having HIV.  The court specifically held that there was no duty to warn plaintiff that defendant 
was a member of a high-risk group, and that a defendant who has had unprotected sexual 
encounters with multiple partners does not have a legal duty to inform a plaintiff of his or her 
past sexual activity. 
151 One court noted that a single admission, “I have herpes,” may be sufficient 
notice to meet the duty of care. R.A.P v. B.J.P, supra at 108.Third party actions create even more 
fact specific inquiries into the issue of whether duty exists. For example, in one case where a wife 
sued her husband’s lover for transmittal of genital herpes, the issue of whether the lover owed a 
duty to the wife became the subject of remand, to determine: whether the defendant knew or 
should have known that she had herpes, and had copulated with the wife’s husband while 
infectious, and whether she knew he was married (making it foreseeable that her lover would in 
turn give the disease to his wife, as sexual relations between spouses are foreseeable. Lockhart v. 
Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074 (Okla. 1997).  In addition, even in situations in which it is determined that 
the lover knew all of the above, if the adulterous spouse knew or should have known of the 
disease and passes it on to his spouse anyhow, his negligence may supersede his lover’s, cutting 
off proximate cause based on “termination of the risk” concepts.  See Mussivand v. David, 45 
Ohio St. 3d 3143, 544 N.E. 2dc. 265 (1989).
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avoid transmitting herpes has been rejected,152 a Washington court has held that 
there is no duty of sexual fidelity even in marital relationships (that is, the 
marriage relationship is not a “special relationship”)153 and therefore no duty to 
disclose extramarital sexual relations, despite the clear health risks involved.154
Other courts more broadly define the duty to include protecting others from 
infection, which may involve more than a mere admission of the disease.155
Most courts have found that a duty not to spread infection exists between 
sexual partners if the defendant knew or should have known of his disease, 
regardless of marriage,156 or that the intimate nature of the sexual relationship 
created a “special relationship,” and attendant duty of care.157
The main focus in published decisions has been whether defendant knew of his 
disease, or was aware of facts such that he should have known of it, i.e., 
foreseeability.158  The problem is that many people who carry sexual diseases 
152 Hamblen v. Davidson, 50 S.W.3d 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) appeal den. 
(May 14, 2001). 
153 A defendant’s relationship to the plaintiff has been held to create a duty of 
care in a number of relationships, sometimes referred to as “special relationships,” and include a 
landowner’s duty to protect customers or tenants, a school’s duty to protect students, an 
employer’s duty to protect employees who are endangered on the job, and a custodian’s duty to 
protect persons in custody, such as prisoners and involuntarily committed mental patients. See 
DOBBS, supra  n. 4 at 874 – 891.
154 In Re Marriage of J.T., 77 Wash.App. 361, 891 P.2d 729 (1995); McPherson 
v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1045-6 (1998)(court rejected wife’s argument that husband owed 
her a duty of sexual fidelity based on the marital relationship and that breach was actionable 
when it lead to physical harm, instead relying on the more general concept that where a person 
knows or should know that he or she is infected with a sexually transmitted disease, he or she is 
under a duty to protect sexual partners from infection). 
155 McPherson v. McPherson; Milbank Ins. Co. v. B.L.G., 484 N.W.2d 52 
(Minn.Ct.App. 1992), called into doubt on other grounds, American Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 
628 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 2001)(a person who knows he or she has herpes has a duty to use 
reasonable care to avoid infecting others).
156 See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal.App.3d 992, 198 Cal.Rptr. 273, 
277 (1984)(“Consent to sexual intercourse vitiated by one partner’s fraudulent concealment of 
the risk of infection with venereal disease is equally applicable today, whether or not partners 
involved are married to each other”); Smith v. Walker, 11 Pa.D. & C. 4th 663, 665 (Ct. Common 
Pleas 1991); Long v. Adams, 175 Ga.App. 538, 333 S.E.2d 852, cert.den. (Ga. 1985); Berner v. 
Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686 (Ala.1989);  McPherson v. McPherson, supra;  Milbank Ins. Co. v. 
B.L.G., supra; Doe v. Roe, 218 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1545, 267 Cal.Rptr. 564 (1990)(people 
suffering from genital herpes generally have a duty either to avoid sexual contact with uninfected 
persons or at least to warn potential sex partners that they have herpes before sexual contact 
occurs); R.A.P. v. B.J.P, 428 N.W.2d 103, 108 (1988)(“people suffering from genital herpes 
generally have a duty either to avoid sexual contact with uninfected persons or, at least, to warn 
potential sex partners that they have herpes before sexual contact occurs.”)
157 Roe v. Doe, 218 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1542 (1990)(herpes). 
158 Tort Liability For Sexually Transmitted Diseases, supra  n. 2 at nn. 17-18 and 
accompanying text. For example, in Hamblen v. Davidson, 50 S.W.3d 433 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000), 
appeal den’d (May 14, 2001), husband claimed that he owed no duty not to transmit herpes to his 
wife, but material fact existed as to what the husband knew about his health condition, and failed 
to tell wife, which precluded summary judgment for husband.  Foreseeability is crucial to 
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do not know that they have a disease, but shielding them from liability based on 
their own ignorance is contrary to the public policy of protecting the citizenry 
from contagious diseases. The factual issues surrounding the determination of 
whether defendant “knew or should have known” that he was infected, e.g., 
symptoms of disease, have given rise to the most successful defense in sexual 
disease cases, the “I did not know I had it” defense.159  Realistically, most 
sexual disease transmission is perpetrated by persons whose sexual behavior 
predictably results in disease transmission.160 As a practical reality, disease 
perpetrators have constructive notice that they are creating an unreasonable risk 
of harm to others on account of their sexual practices. Yet, courts have been 
reluctant to impose liability based on constructive notice. 
The negligence analysis is counterproductive to public policy because it is fact-
specific, puts the plaintiff’s sexuality on trial, and allows defendants to behave 
irresponsibly, claim ignorance, and externalize all of the costs of their sexual 
defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of the risk (often analyzed as 
comparative fault). See DOBBS, supra n. 4 at 534-9. 
159 This factual claim by defendant destroys foreseeability and therefore duty 
(and proximate cause, which turns on foreseeability) in negligence-based claims. For example, in 
one case where a woman sued defendant (her ex-husband) for transmittal of genital herpes, the 
central issue in the case was whether there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that the defendant knew, or should have known, that he was putting his wife at risk at 
the time he engaged in sexual relations with her. Meany v. Meany, 639 So.2d 229 (La. 1994), 
distinguished on other grounds in Leleux v. U.S., 178 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1999).  The evidence 
included the following: defendant had contact with multiple sexual partners during a period of 
separation from plaintiff; plaintiff’s first symptoms occurred after reconciliation (and resumed 
sexual relations) with the defendant; and, when plaintiff confronted defendant with her herpes 
diagnosis, defendant admitted that he had experienced a problem with penile “drippage” and had 
seen a doctor about it. The main issue was whether defendant’s awareness of his penile drippage 
constituted sufficient notice of a sexual disease such that he breached a duty of care to plaintiff by 
failing to take reasonable measures to make sure that whatever infection was causing the dripping 
was not transmitted to his wife.  The fact that he had multiple sexual partners during a short 
period of separation did not establish the foreseeability necessary to allow a finding of negligence 
in and of itself, but helped to establish the link between drippage and a sexual disease In another 
case, a man was held not liable for transmitting AIDS to his fiancée because he had no reason to 
know, based on the information available to the public at that time, that his single homosexual 
experience could have resulted in him contracting AIDS. See C.A.U. v. R. L., 438 N.W.2d 441 
(Minn.Ct.App. 1989). See, also RAP v. BJP, supra (case remanded to determine whether 
defendant informed her husband that she had herpes before marriage and before he contracted 
herpes (she said) or after marriage and after he contracted herpes (he said)). See, also Delay v. 
Delay, 707 So.2d 400 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1998)(defendant/husband claimed no 
knowledge that he had a sexually transmitted disease, and no evidence was presented to prove 
that he knew); Smith v. Speligene, 990 P.2d 312 (Okla. Civ.App. Div. 4 1999)(whether a duty 
existed turned in part on factual question of whether defendant knew she had a contagious disease 
that could be transmitted to defendant-ex-boyfriend); McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 
(Me. 1998)(ex-husband did not breach duty of care to ex-wife by transmitting Human Papilloma 
Virus because he did not know he had it at the time he infected her); Doe v. Roe, 157 Misc.2d 
690, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678(no proof by preponderance that defendant knew she had Chlamydia at the 
time she had sex with her boyfriend); 
160 See supra Sec. II.C. 
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behavior not just to the victim, but to society at large (through health insurance 
and public aid).  Not only is the current negligence paradigm failing to deter 
irresponsible sexual behavior, it actually discourages the most sexually active 
“core” group members from getting tested to avoid any proof of knowledge of 
their disease, to avoid a finding of fault under a negligence standard.161 Tort law 
should encourage potential disease perpetrators to get tested and to behave 
responsibly to avoid disease transmission, not give them an escape route rooted 
in their own ignorance. Although causation may be difficult to establish in 
some cases, adopting a strict duty of care would avoid the most difficult 
analysis relating to foreseeability in current sex tort jurisprudence. 162
2. Intentional Theories
Sometimes plaintiffs in sexual disease transmission cases have sought remedies 
under intentional tort theories.  Courts have held that actions for fraud and 
battery may lie where the plaintiff can show that defendant intended to deceive 
plaintiff regarding a sexual disease and plaintiff justifiably relied on 
defendant’s misrepresentations in consenting to sex, contracting a sexual 
disease thereby. Specifically, fraud claims in which plaintiff contracts a 
sexually transmitted disease from defendant requires a showing that the 
defendant made some representation about his health that was untrue, that 
plaintiff relied on that misrepresentation in agreeing to engage in sexual 
relations, and that plaintiff was infected as a result.163   The crucial issues in 
fraud claims are whether defendant knew of his disease and whether he made 
false representations for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to have sex.164
161 As stated by Professor Mekel, the most logical way to prove knowledge of 
disease is to obtain defendant’s medical records showing disease diagnosis; one way of avoiding 
such a showing of fault is to avoid diagnosis. See Mekel, supra  n.  140 at 953.
162 Cause in fact could conceivably cause huge obstacles to recovery where 
plaintiff has multiple sexual partners, as it is not always possible to determine which partner 
transmitted the disease to the other through medical testing.  See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 157 Misc.2d 
690, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1993)(there was no more proof that defendant transmitted Chlamydia to 
plaintiff than there was proof that plaintiff transmitted it to defendant). However, cause in fact 
has rarely been an issue in published cases.
163 Tort Liability For Sexually Transmitted Diseases, supra  n. 2 at Sec. 6.  The 
elements for fraud are: 1) false representation by defendant; 2) defendant knew the representation 
was false or made it with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity; 3) the representation was 
made for the purpose of inducing another to rely on it; 4) the plaintiff relied on the representation 
and had the right to rely on it (it was reasonable to rely on it) and would not have done the thing 
from which damage resulted in the absence of the representation; and 5) plaintiff suffered 
damages as a result. See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 149, 538 A.2d 1175, 1182 (1988). Note 
that defendant’s omission may also be sufficient, where he knew of a disease and failed to 
disclose it. RAP v. BJP, 428 N.W.2d 103 (1988); In the Matter of Jose Plaza, 211 A.D.2d 111, 
626 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1995)(homosexual defendant failed to tell his partner/plaintiff that his former 
partner died of AIDS, and plaintiff contracted HIV from defendant).
164 See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988), aff’d 349 Md. 
777, 709 A.2d 1287 (1998)(nurse alleged that doctor had genital herpes and was aware of his 
disease and nonetheless had sex with her without telling her, causing her to contract herpes, 
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Similarly, battery cases involving sexual disease turn on the concept that 
plaintiff’s consent to sex was vitiated based on defendant’s misrepresentation or 
failure to disclose a disease; defendant’s knowledge of his disease and intent to 
expose his partner to the disease must be shown for consent to be vitiated via 
fraud or mistake.165  Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a 
showing that defendant acted intentionally or recklessly in giving plaintiff a 
disease.166  Once again, absent proof that defendant knew of his disease, 
plaintiff is unlikely to prevail.167
The fault element under these intentional tort theories is harder to prove than 
the fault element in negligence cases, since a finding that defendant “should 
have known” of his disease may be sufficient for negligence, but intentional 
torts require plaintiff to show that defendant actually knew of his disease. 
Considering the difficulty in proving defendant’s knowledge of his disease, 
these intentional tort theories are even less effective at deterring sexual 
misconduct and compensating disease victims than negligence theory.
IV.  STRICT LIABILITY FOR TRANSMITTING A SEXUAL DISEASE
“Although loathe to create new causes of action in tort law, the law must 
nevertheless adapt to the society in which it exists.”168
stated cause of action for fraud); Dubovsky v. Dubovsky, 188 Misc. 2d 127, 725 N.Y.S.2d 832 
(Sup. 2001)(one spouse failing to tell other of sexual disease can constitute fraud); R.A.P. v. 
B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 108-9 (1988)(fraudulent transmission of herpes can be stated upon 
showing that defendant knew she had the disease and was silent, allowing plaintiff to contract the 
disease). 
165 See, e.g. De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936); Crowell v. 
Crowell, 180 N.C.516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920);  Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So.2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
5th Dist. 1995)(wife’s consent to sex with husband was vitiated by his failure to inform her of his 
genital warts, and wife’s consent without knowledge was the equivalent of no consent, citing 
Restatement of Torts Second (1977): “A consents to sexual intercourse with B, who knows that A 
is ignorant of the fact that B has a venereal disease. B is subject to liability to A for battery.”); 
Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal.App.3d 992, 198 Cal.Rptr. 273 (1984), reh’g denied, opinion 
modified (Aug. 12, 1989); Leleux v. U.S., 178 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1990)(officer’s fraudulent 
concealment of disease that he transmitted via intercourse held to have vitiated consent, so that 
sexual contact constituted battery.)
166 See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 146, 538 A.2d 1175, 1181 (1988), aff’d
349 Md. 777, 709 A.2d 1287 (1998)(recognizing that a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress may be stated where plaintiff shows that defendant knew of his disease and 
presents proof of the other elements of the claim).Tort Liability For Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases, supra  n. 2 at Sec. 7; B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 144, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988), aff’d 349 
Md. 777, 709 A.2d 1287 (1998). 
167 See Doe v. Roe, 157 Misc. 2d 690, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678 (J.Ct. 1993).  
168 Silver v. Levittown Union Free School Dist., 180 Misc.2d 1015, 692 
N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (1999)(wrestler who contracted herpes from other wrestler during a wrestling 
match stated a cause of action for negligent transmission of a disease.)
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Strict liability is liability without fault. That is, defendant may be liable for 
conduct that is neither negligent nor intentional, based on principles of social 
justice and public policy which may have nothing to do with wrongdoing or 
punishment.  These principles emerge from an analysis of a number of factors, 
including: maximizing control of a public health threat; fair allocation of costs, 
including cost-effectiveness of risk allocation (who is the cheapest cost-
avoider); deterrence of cost-producing behavior; blameworthiness; and legal 
precedent.  
There are two basic questions that must be addressed before imposing a strict 
duty not to transmit a sexual disease: first, is it consistent with social justice; 
and second, will it advance public policy by slowing the spread of sexual 
diseases? 
A. Does Strict Liability For Sexual Disease Transmission Further Social 
Justice?
In assessing fairness, the question is whether negligence or strict liability is 
more fair as between the parties involved and society at large.  Fairness is 
always a relative question when someone must suffer a loss, and strict liability 
imposes costs on a class of persons who cause harm as opposed to imposing 
liability on a case by case basis, i.e., a negligence analysis.  
Strict liability is superior to negligence based on concepts of individual and 
societal fairness and an economic analysis of law grounded in cost-avoidance. 
In order to maximize public protection, many violations of law result in strict 
liability, such as health and safety regulations, traffic laws, and narcotics 
control laws; intent is not required because the underlying purpose of these 
laws is public protection.169 Indeed, strict liability already exists relative to 
sexual activity resulting in pregnancy: there is no excuse for avoiding child 
support payments upon proof of paternity.170 Many states already have criminal 
169 See, e.g., U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-1 (1943)(“Such legislation 
dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct – awareness of some 
wrongdoing – in the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a 
person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”) 
170 The Congressional Family Support Act of 1988 adjusted the cost-benefit 
analysis of unprotected sexual activity by creating better enforcement mechanisms to force 
noncustodial parents to pay child support, whether married to the child’s custodial parent or not, 
thereby forcing the noncustodial parent to internalize child care costs that otherwise would 
remain external to the noncustodial parent.  This is true even where conception results from a 
party’s contraceptive fraud, no doubt because allowing damages would divest the mother of the 
very funds required  to support  the child. See In re Pamela P., 110 Misc. 2d 978, 443 N.Y.S.2d 
343 (Fam.Ct.1981), rev’d, In re L Pamila P. v. Frank S., 59 N.Y.2d 1, 462 N.Y.S.2d 819, 449 
N.E.2d 713 (1983); Sorrel v. Henson, 1998 WL 886561 (Tenn.App. 1998); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 
38 Wash. App. 288, 687 P.2d 223 (1984); Wallis v. Smith, 130 N.M. 214, 22 P.2d 682 (2001).  
See also Anne M. Payne, Annot, Sexual Partner’s Tort Liability to Other Partner for Fraudulent 
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penalties for transmitting a sexual disease.171 While some states have not 
allowed negligence per se liability resulting from violation of these criminal 
laws (a species of strict liability, as duty and breach issues are pre-determined 
by the legislature), others have indicated a willingness to recognize negligence 
per se liability.172  Therefore, strict liability for sexual disease transmission is 
Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of Birth Control Resulting in Pregnancy, 2 
A.L.R.5th 301 (1992). 
171 See e.g.,  State v. Lankford, 29 Del. 594, 102 A.63, 64 (DEL.GEN.SESS. 
1917); 63 OKL.ST.ANN. Sec. 1-519 (63 O.S. 1991 Sec. 1-519, formerly 63 OK.ST.ANN. 543 
(1921). 
172 Indeed, tort damages were first awarded as part of a criminal prosecution. W. 
PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 8 (5th ed. 1984),  citing POLLOCK, LAW 
OF TORTS 150 (15th ed. 1951). A few states have recognized that violation of a statute making 
sexual disease transmission a crime may give rise to a negligence per se claim, but others have 
held that the criminal statutes set forth a policy, not grounds for a civil lawsuit.  63 
OKL.ST.ANN. Section 1-519 (63 O.S.1991 Sec. 1-519) provides in pertinent part: “Diseased 
persons – Marriage or sexual intercourse. It shall be unlawful and a felony for any person, after 
becoming an infected person and before being discharged and pronounced cured by a physician 
in writing, to marry any other person, or to expose any other person by the act of copulation or 
sexual intercourse to such venereal disease or to liability to contract the same.” This law appears 
to be identical, or nearly identical, to a law existing since at least 1921. See  63 OKL.ST.ANN. 
Sec 543 (Comp.St.1921 Sec. 9008); 63 O.S.1941, Sec. 543; See also Panther v. McNight, 125 
Okla. 134, 256 P.916 (1926)(civil damages awarded relying on statute). Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 
P.2d 1074 (1997). The court in Lockhart discussed the risk rule, and found against the wife 
because, in review of the statutory language and apparent legislative intent, she was not a 
member of the class sought to be protected by the statute. However, the court impolied that, had 
the husband sued, he would have been a part of the protected class, and presumably would have 
stated a claim based on negligence per se. Cal. Health & Safety Code Section 3198, enacted in 
1957, provides in part, “any person . . . who exposes any person to or infects any person with any 
venereal disease . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.”   This section was replaced by Section 120600 
in 1995, but the new statute contains the same language quoted above and the statute as a whole 
is almost identical. No case has addressed the issue of whether a violation of this statute results in 
liability based on a theory of negligence per se.  NY Public Health Law Section 2307 provides: 
“Any person who, knowing himself or herself to be infected with an infectious venereal disease, 
has sexual intercourse with another shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”  In Maharam v. Maharam, 
510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107, the court stated that a husband had a duty to tell his wife that he had 
become infected with herpes, based on the 31 year marital relationship, and failure to do so states 
a cause of action for constructive, if not actual, fraud.  The court stated that the duty to speak 
could also be predicated upon Section 2307 based on negligence per se.  ALA CODE 1975, Sec. 
22-11-21(c) provides: “Any person afflicted with a sexually transmitted disease who shall 
knowingly transmit, or assume the risk of transmitting, or do any act which will probably or 
likely transmit such disease to another person shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.”  In 
Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte General Motors 
Corp., 769 So.2d 903 (1999), a woman brought an action against her former boyfriend for 
allegedly giving her herpes.  The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the boyfriend, 
who claimed he had no knowledge that he had herpes. The court nonetheless stated: “That civil 
liability, to be determined according to the traditional rules of tort law, should also attach to allow 
recovery for damages resulting from the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease is a 
natural corollary to the legislative will as statutorily expressed. With the rise in the number of 
reported cases of sexually transmitted diseases, and in view of the harm that results from these 
diseases, the imposition of such civil liability is clearly warranted.”  Id. at 689. (emphasis added.) 
OHIO R.C. 3701.81(A) provides: “No person, knowingly or having reasonable cause to believe 
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not a radical departure from existing law, but rather a predictable departure 
necessitated by public health policy. 
General social justice policies surrounding imposition of strict tort liability, 
both historical and economic, support imposing strict liability for transmitting a 
sexual disease. 173  As a basic rule, as between two innocent parties, the person 
causing harm should pay the costs of harm as opposed to the person who is 
harmed, particularly where the risk created by the injurer is disproportionate to 
the risk created by the victim, i.e., the “paradigm of reciprocity” supports 
imposing costs on the injurer.174  Historically, strict liability has been imposed 
on persons and entities that choose to engage in abnormally dangerous 
activities, or to own wild animals with known dangerous propensities, because 
they have chosen to create a non-reciprocal risk to society. The idea is that they 
should pay the costs of their chosen pursuits, because avoiding all harm to 
others is not possible: “When an . . . individual . . . engages in systematic or 
repeated activity, . . . , some risks are more or less typical or characteristic of 
that he is suffering from a dangerous, contagious disease, shall knowingly fail to take reasonable 
measures to prevent exposing himself to other persons, except when seeking medical aid.”   In 
Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314 (1989), the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that this 
statute created negligence per se liability. The court stated that where a statute did not expressly 
provide for civil liability, a distinction must be made between statutes that prohibit specific acts 
and statutes that express a rule of conduct; only the former gave rise to negligence per se liability. 
Id. at 319-320.  F.S.A. (Florida) Section 384.24 provides that it is unlawful to knowingly transmit 
a sexually transmitted disease.   In Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So.2d 404 (1991), the court reversed the 
appellate court’s decision that violation of the statute constituted negligence per se. The court 
stated that in order for a violation of a statute to constitute negligence per se, it must relate to a 
particular injury and a particular class of persons.  The court relied on a legislative declaration of 
intent that stated that sexually transmitted diseases are a “threat to the public and individual 
health and welfare of the state,” and that such language shows that the statute was not designed to 
protected a “particular class of persons, but rather the public in general.”  Id. at 405.  The court 
held that a violation of the statute nonetheless presented prima facie evidence of negligence, just 
not absolute proof of negligence.  Id. Louisiana REV.STAT.ANN. Sec. 14:43.5 (West 
Supp.1994) makes it unlawful for a person to inoculate or infect another person in any manner 
with a venereal disease or to do any act which will expose another to inoculation or infection with 
a venereal disease.  The court in Meany v. Meany, 639 So.2d 229 (1994) reviewed whether 
violation of the statute could result in liability based on negligence per se. The court first stated 
that the courts have not adopted a policy of strict liability, or negligence per se, when the 
transmission of venereal disease has been statutorily prohibited. Id at 235.  The court then relied 
on Mussivand to conclude that the statute merely states a rule of conduct.
173 Prior to 1850, American courts followed the English common law rule that 
direct physical injury to another’s person entailed strict liability, but beginning in 1850 in 
Massachusetts, courts began necessitating a showing of fault for recovery for personal injury, 
even if direct. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850). Since sexual disease results from direct 
contact, a common law Trespass action should lie, although most Trespass cases involved 
“unauthorized” use of physical force, which could exclude consensual sexual relations despite the 
direct nature of the injury.  See DOBBS, supra n. 4 at 259-266.  See also Richard A. Epstein, A 
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Leg. Stud. 151, 152 & n. 2 (1973)(arguing that the shift from strict 
liability to negligence was based on moral, not economic, grounds).
174 See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 
537, 543 (1972).  This assumes one diseased partner in sexual activity.
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the activity even when no negligence can be shown.”175  Deterrence is also 
sometimes cited as a reason for strict liability: it encourages persons engaged in 
abnormally dangerous activities to find safer methods or safer places for their 
activities.176  No fault need be shown because the nature of the activity or 
substance is known to risk serious bodily harm or death to others and there is 
no way to control that risk altogether.177 For this reason, plaintiff’s negligence, 
or even intentional wrongdoing, has traditionally not been a bar to recovery 
under strict liability.178
According to the scientific data, a small subgroup of Americans are choosing to 
engage in promiscuous sexual activity which has lead to a sexual disease 
epidemic that is costing the American public billions annually.179  The 
statistically few persons who choose to have sex with a large number of 
partners are creating a high risk of serious bodily harm or even death to others 
that cannot be completely eliminated by exercising reasonable care.180  It is 
unfair for society at large to pay the price for the irresponsible sexual behavior 
of a small percentage of our citizens who choose a dangerous lifestyle, 
particularly since their dangerous activity lacks social utility.181
175 DOBBS, supra n. 4 at 909 (discussing enterprise [strict] liability theory).
176 DOBBS, supra n. 4 at 964-5. 
177 The Second Restatement sets forth factors to determine whether strict 
liability should be imposed on an activity, a) creates a high risk of some harm to the person, land 
or chattels of others; b) with a likelihood of great harm, c) that cannot be avoided by reasonable 
care,  d) the activity is uncommon, and e) inappropriate to the particular site. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS, Sec. 520. Whether the activity benefits the community at large so as to 
outweigh the risks should also be considered. Id. at 520(f).
178 Indeed, the Restatement takes the view that intervention of third parties is a 
part of the risk of abnormally dangerous activity, at least where the third party is not guilty of 
intentional wrongdoing. See DOBBS, supra n. 4  at 960. Assumption of the risk may be a defense 
where the plaintiff  “knowingly and unreasonably” subjects himself to the risk of harm, which 
includes a true understanding of the nature of the risk and voluntary assumption of it. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 524 (2); Rickrode v. Wistinghausen, 128 
Mich.App. 240, 340 N.W.2d 83 (1983)(willfully provoking an animal may provide a defense to 
strict liability.)  
179 See supra Sec. II.C. 
180 While condoms can retard the spread of certain sexual diseases, the fastest 
growing viral disease today, the human papilloma virus, is believed not to be controllable by 
condom usage.  See supra Sec. II.A.  In addition, we know that some of the most promiscuous 
people fail to use condoms regularly. See supra  Sec. II.C. One reason for strict liability is to 
coerce those engaged in a high risk activity to find safer methods, so strict liability in the sexual 
disease context could encourage condom usage and thereby reduce the risks of most diseases. 
181 RESTATEMENT, Sec. 520(f). Epstein, supra n. 238 at 189; Guido 
Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L. J. 656, 671 (1974-1975).  Unlike 
businesses that cause nuisances, for example, where a balance must be made between social 
value and social cost of the nuisance, there is little or no social utility resulting from irresponsible 
sex leading to the spread of sexual disease. 
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Liability should be placed on the party to an interaction who is in the best 
position to “make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and 
avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made.”182 In the sexual 
disease context, there is often no ability for the parties to negotiate fairly who 
should bear the risk of loss, because of a lack of information. In a sense, an 
information defect is present when neither party is aware of the disease. As 
between a diseased individual and his uninfected sexual partner, the diseased 
person has superior access to information regarding his disease and the 
potential costs associated with transmission.  Diseased persons are therefore the  
cheapest cost-avoiders, so  clear, strict duty not to transmit diseases should be 
placed on them.183 Uninfected persons will continue to have an incentive to 
avoid disease transmission, as they necessarily internalize the pain and 
suffering and emotional distress resulting from infection.  Strict liability will 
simply shift those costs capable of being shifted to disease perpetrators and 
force them to absorb at least some of the costs of their behavior, instead of 
externalizing most of the costs to victims and taxpayers. 
From an economic standpoint, strict liability is administratively cheaper than 
negligence. The negligence paradigm burdens legal analysis in that it “demands 
evaluation of almost everything, but can give precise weight to almost 
nothing.”184  The sexual disease cases bear out the truth that negligence creates 
more issues than it solves, inhibits litigation and compensation by its 
unpredictable application, and focuses on morality as opposed to the need for 
compensation and deterrence relative to a serious disease epidemic. Strict 
liability avoids both the unfairness and complications created by the negligence 
paradigm because it avoids the difficult factfinding relative to the elements of 
duty and breach.185
182 Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test For Strict Liability in 
Torts, 81 Yale L. J. 1055, 1060 (1972). 
183 Even where the diseased person is unaware of his infection, he still has 
superior access to that information over the uninfected person, and is still “relatively more likely 
to find out whether avoidance is worth it.”Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra n. 182 at 1061. 
184 See Epstein, supra n.  173 at 171.  
185 Perhaps more importantly, increasing the certainty of liability directly 
impacts disease perpetrators’ individual cost-benefit analysis by increasing the potential costs of 
irresponsible sexual activity, which enhances the deterrent impact of law, ultimately reducing the 
number of cases of disease transmission. See infra Sec. IV.B.1. Core group members will most 
often get sued. In the short run, administrative costs could increase as a function of a greater 
number of claims filed resulting from the certainty of recovery. That is, the universe of claims 
may be enlarged such that the overall administrative costs increase despite lowered costs of each 
lawsuit resulting from streamlined legal analysis. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A 
Comment, 2 J. Leg. Stud. 205, 209 (1973). However, since liability will be more certain, 
settlements are facilitated, which are cheaper than trials. Thus, any temporary increase to 
administrative costs resulting from more lawsuits will be outweighed by expedited trials, more 
settlement, and ultimately, less sexual disease transmission resulting from strict liability’s 
deterrent effect.
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The plaintiff’s need for compensation and defendant’s ability to pay have been 
major considerations supporting imposition of strict products liability.186 While 
this “deep pocket” concept does not support strict liability for sex torts, it is not 
a reason to reject strict liability. The lack of a deep pocket in sex tort cases  may 
be a problem whether liability is based on negligence or strict liability, as 
insurance companies are rejecting negligence-based claims arising out of sexual 
relations, anyhow.187  Yet, the number of sex tort actions filed continues to 
increase, so sex tort analysis should improve in terms of clear standards of 
liability if not collectability.  Although strict liability neither advances nor 
inhibits the plaintiff’s ability to collect on a judgment, it is superior to 
negligence on other bases. 
There may be even more compelling reasons for imposing strict liability for 
sexual disease transmission grounded in social science. Although there is 
debate over whether the law impacts social norms, or vice versa, and to what 
degree, it appears clear that when the law converges with public consensus, it is 
most effective as a social engineering tool. Legal doctrine has emerged 
grounded in the belief that promiscuous – even extramarital – sex is ubiquitous 
and thereby arguably socially acceptable.188 Yet, research shows that the vast 
majority of Americans are not promiscuous and presumably do not condone 
promiscuity. Sex tort law should converge with public consensus to maximize 
its effectiveness. The next section will review deterrence and norm 
creation/regulation theories and conclude that  strict liability is superior to 
negligence because it more powerfully deters sexual disease and more 
accurately expresses social values. 
B. Will Adopting Strict Liability Deter Sexual Disease Transmission?
For centuries, there has been a debate about whether the law impacts human 
behavior, and if so, how?189 Some tort scholars posit that the law reflects 
186 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra n.   4 at p. 975.
187 For example, State Farm Insurance homeowners’ policies contain exclusions 
for all communicable diseases, including sexually transmitted diseases. Interview with Sophie 
Harbert, State Farm Insurance, Austin, Texas, August 10, 2005.  More generally, the insurance 
industry is expected to deny liability for sexually transmitted diseases. Interview with Loretta 
Wortes, Vice President, Insurance Information Institute (New York),  August 12, 2005.
188 See supra Section III.B.
189 There are fundamental concerns about whether law impacts behavior at all, 
grounded in different philosophies about the etiology of misconduct.  For example, positivists 
believe that behavior is grounded in biological make up. Cesare Lombroso, the “father of 
criminology,”  (1835 – 1909) expanded on the concept of biological determinism around the 
same time that research grounded in sociological positivism – the study of the influence of social 
factors to explain criminal conduct – became influential, particularly the research of researchers 
such as Robert Ezra Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Louis Wirth at the University of Chicago.  
Organic and biological psychological theories attribute behavior to brain dysfunction or 
molecular biology, respectively.  These theories undermine the concept that the law is effective to 
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society’s values,190 while others posit that the law can be used as a tool of social 
engineering, to shape society’s values.191  Perhaps the answer lies somewhere in 
between; perhaps the relationship between law and societal values is symbiotic 
and fluid. There is no doubt that rational people respond to legal rules to avoid 
sanctions where the rules are tailored to maximize public awareness and risk 
aversion.192 Thus, while scholars sometimes claim that morality cannot be 
legislated,193 at least some “moral” behavior has been proven to be amenable to 
manipulation through law.194 It is therefore fair to assume that the law can 
impact human behavior.195
1.  Individual Deterrence Based On The Rational Actor 
Assumption
“[S]ociety has continued to rely on the tort system to provide ‘general 
deterrence.’ The threat of tort liability should induce rational actors to take 
‘optimal care’ – that is, to reduce the chance of accidents to the point at which 
change human behavior because they posit that people inherit criminal traits, and are “born 
criminals.” See, e.g., David Lykken, Psychopathy, Sociopathy, and Crime, 34 Society 29  (1996); 
PETER SCOTT, HENRY MAUDSLEY, PIONEERS OF CRIMINOLOGY (1981); HOWARD 
BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE  21 (1963); Nicole 
Hahn Rafter, Criminal Anthropology in the United States, 30 Criminology 525 (1992). On the 
other end of the spectrum is classical criminology, grounded in the prevailing philosophy of 
utilitarianism in the mid-eighteenth century, which has evolved into rational choice and 
deterrence theories, and which posits that criminals are rational and utilize available information 
concerning costs and benefits of crime in order to determine whether crime is worthwhile. See
Francis Edward Devine, Cesare Beccaria and the Theoretical Foundations of Modern Penal 
Jurisprudence, 7 New England Journal on Prison Law 8 (1982); JEREMY BENTHAM, A 
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1967). While there are probably many factors that give rise to 
antisocial behavior, the law necessarily relies on rational choice and deterrence theories, because 
without the basic concept that legal punishment impacts behavior, the law as a tool of social 
engineering would be worthless.  See also Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in 
Tort Law,  42 U. Kan. L. Rev. 115 (1993). 
190 See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship 
Can Teach Us about the American Experience, 89 N.W. U. L. Rev. 1567, 1569 (tort 
jurisprudence reflects society’s basic principles.)
191 See infra  Sec. IV.B.2. 
192 Id. 
193 See, e.g., Jennifer E. McDougal, Legislating Morality: The Actions for 
Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation in North Carolina, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
163, 177 (1998).
194 For example, drunk driving behavior has been proven to be controllable to a 
substantial degree through increased, well-publicized legal sanctions. See infra Sec. IV.B.1.
195 All economists, including those persons making predictions about the law’s 
impact on behavior grounded in the rational actor assumption, make assumptions.  As stated by 
A. Mitchell Polinsky, “The truth [about economists] is that they approach problems by making 
assumptions. The lie is that they make ridiculous assumptions (though, unfortunately, this is not 
always a lie.)”  See POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (3rd ed. 
2003).
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the cost of any further accident prevention measures would exceed the injury 
losses they would prevent. Optimal care thus minimizes the sum of accident 
costs. Optimal deterrence of tortious conduct – of inefficient risk-taking—is the 
system’s dominant utilitarian function.”196
Economic analysis of law has been termed the most powerful influence on legal 
doctrine in the past half century.197  Economic analysis of law relies on criminal 
deterrence theory’s “rational actor” assumption198 and  provides a fundamental 
truth about human behavior: people respond to incentives (a general statement 
of price theory).199 At the root of economic theory is the expectation that 
humans will seek rationally to maximize their expected utility, or self-interest, 
usually referred to as “rational choice theory.”200  Rational choice theory relies 
on the assumption that the law shapes behavior by “taxing” socially undesirable 
behavior and “subsidizing” socially desirable behavior.201
Classical deterrence theory predicts that the efficacy of a legal sanction to 
modify behavior rests on perceptions of certainty, swiftness, and severity of 
legal sanctions following a violation of the law.202 Deterrence theory posits that
if the probability of being caught and suffering negative consequences is high 
enough, people will choose not to engage in conduct that results in sanctions. 
The evidence that sane people do indeed consider the risk of being punished for 
their conduct is compelling.203  Criminal researchers believe that crime persists 
196 David A. Fischer, Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence And The 
Probability Paradox, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1201, 1204 (1993). 
197 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 Cal.L.Rev. 1051, 
1055 (2000). 
198 The majority of philosophical writings on human conduct are grounded in 
criminology, no doubt because controlling the most offensive, dangerous human conduct is a 
priority in any society. See Daniel W. Shuman,  The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law,  42 
U. Kan. L. Rev. 115, 116 & n. 5 (1993). These theories are closely related to the efficacy of tort 
law, because tort law, like criminal law, involves socially unacceptable conduct that government 
attempts to control through law. Indeed, the first time damages were awarded was in a criminal 
matter.   W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 8 (5th ed. 1984), citing 
POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 150 (15th ed. 1951). 
199 Korobkin & Ulen, supra n.  197 at 1054.
200 Id. at 1055, 1060-1070.  
201 See, generally, Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. 
L. Rev. 903, 951 (1996);  Korobkin & Ulen, supra  n. 197  at 1054. 
202 Berger & Marelich, Legal and Social Control of Alcohol-impaired Driving in 
California: 1983-1994, 58 J. Stud. Alcohol 518, 518-20 (1997). 
203 For example, People who believe that they will be punished for future crimes say that 
they will not commit future crimes. Daniel Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, 
Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and 
Evidence, 39 Criminology 865 (2001). Robbers generally choose victims who are vulnerable, 
have low coercive power, and who pose no threat, such as unarmed people, elderly people, and 
females. Richard Felson & Steven Messner, To Kill or Not to Kill? Lethal Outcomes in Injurious 
Attacks, 34 Criminology 519, 541 (1996); JAMES WRIGHTS & PETER ROSSI, ARMED AND 
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because criminals believe that there is only a small chance of being caught, and 
if they are caught, there is a good chance of receiving lenient punishment.204
The price or “cost” of crime is a function of the certainty of punishment and the 
severity of punishment.205 Empirical studies indicate that the certainty of 
conviction plays a much larger role in deterring crime that does severity of 
DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 141-59 (1983).  Robbers 
also generally pick the time of day carefully, and rob commercial establishments where there is 
the most cash on hand, such as bars, supermarkets, and restaurants or, more generally, during the 
Christmas season, and tend to target places close to home so that they are aware of escape routes. 
Peter Van Koppen & Robert Jansen, The Time to Rob: Variations in Time and Number of 
Commercial Robberies, 36 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 7 (1999); William 
Smith, Sharon Glave Frazee, & Elizabeth Davison, Furthering the Integration of Routine Activity 
and Social Disorganization Theories: Small Units of Analysis and the Study of Street Robbery as 
a Diffusion Process, 38 Criminology 489 (2000); John Gibbs & Peggy Shelly, Life in the Fast 
Lane: A Retrospective View by Commercial Thieves, 19 Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 229 (1982).  Rapists also show rational decision-making in choosing victims and 
locations.  They tend to travel away from their residences to commit the crimes, to avoid 
victimizing women who will recognize them. Older, more experienced rapists travel farther than 
younger rapists who have not learned about the increased risk of detection where victims are 
found close to home. Janet Warren, Roland Reboussin, Robert Hazelwood, Andrea Cummings, 
Natalie Gibbs & Susan Trumbetta, Crime Scene and Distance Correlates of Serial Rape, 14 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology 35 (1998).  Yet, research also shows that people who are 
easily sexually aroused say that they are more likely to act in a sexually aggressive fashion and 
not consider the consequences of their actions. George Lowenstein, Daniel Nagin, & Raymond 
Paternoster, The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forcefulness, 34 Journal of 
Research in Crime and Delinquency 443 (1997). Illegal drug use, which is similar to sexual 
promiscuity in that both entail pleasure seeking that may become addictive, is controlled by 
rational decision-making as well.  People begin using drugs when they view the costs as minimal 
(i.e., friends or family also abuse drugs, so they are unlikely to be socially ostracized) and the 
benefits as outweighing the costs (the positive drug experience is unlikely to result in negative 
consequences). John Petraitis, Brian Flay, & Todd Miller, Reviewing Theories of Adolescent 
Substance Use: Organizing Pieces in the Puzzle,  117 Psychological Bulletin 67 (1995). While 
sexual misconduct differs in some respects from crimes like robbery, the general thesis that 
people tend to maximize their “take” and minimize negative consequences is central to rational 
choice theory, and therefore the research supports rational choice theory in relation to impulsive, 
irresponsible sexual behavior.    It stands to reason that one of the reasons why sexual misconduct 
is so rampant, and sexual disease so pervasive, is the fact that there is very little chance of 
suffering any negative consequences as a result of such misconduct, and the perception among 
offenders is probably that the benefits outweigh the costs. 
204 R. Steven Daniels, Lorin Baumhover, William Formby, & Carolyn Clark-
Daniels, Police Discretion and Elder Mistreatment: A Nested Model of Observation, Reporting 
and Satisfaction, 27 Journal of Criminal Justice 209 (1999).  
205 Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. 
Rev. 349, 377-8 (1997). Of course, a high conviction rate is costly to the state because it takes 
resources to prosecute, and the severity of punishment is also costly, especially if it involves costs 
relating to probation or imprisonment/parole. The standard economic conception of deterrence 
treats severity of punishment and certainty of conviction as interchangeable components of the 
price of crime. Id.  at 377, citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Law and 
the Optimal Use of Non-monetary Sanctions as Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232 (1985).
SEX TORTS                40
punishment.206 There is apparently a “tipping point,” where certainty of 
punishment will work because the likelihood of being caught reaches a 
sufficiently high level: research has found that increasing the severity of 
punishment leads to a lower crime rate,207 but that increasing the severity of 
punishment may have little impact unless the likelihood of getting caught is 
high, because as the likelihood of getting caught decreases, the punishment – no 
matter how severe – tends to be discounted.208 Accordingly, the law should 
engage certain clear liability rules to maximize certainty of punishment.209 One 
way of adjusting the “price” of sexual disease transmission is to adopt strict tort 
liability in lieu of negligence, which dramatically increases the certainty of civil 
sanctions if a lawsuit is filed. 
Increasing the cost of socially undesirable conduct to minimize the conduct has 
worked in other contexts in which the conduct is not intuitively amenable to 
legal manipulation. For example, over the past 25 years, California and most 
other states strengthened laws aimed at controlling alcohol-impaired driving 
significantly.210  Time series analyses have demonstrated that these changes to 
the law are associated with the behavior changes the laws sought to create, i.e., 
lower rates of drunk driving incidents and accidents.211 Between 1983 and 
1994, the public’s knowledge of the new drunk driving laws, and particularly 
206 Kahan, supra n. 205 at 379-80.  See also, e.g., Maynard L. Erickson, Jack P. 
Gibbs & Gary F. Jensen, The Deterrence Doctrine and the Perceived Certainty of Legal 
Punishment, 42 Amer. Sociol. Rev. 305 (1977); Shuman, supra n. 198 at 121 & nn. 31-33.
207 The National Center for Policy Analysis has showed a direct correlation 
between the probability of imprisonment for a particular crime and a subsequent decline in the 
rate of that crime. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: 1997 UPDATE, NATIONAL 
CENETER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, DALLAS, TEXAS.   For example, the probability of 
going to prison for murder increased 17% between 1993 and 1997, and the murder rate dropped 
23% during that same period; the probability of prison for robbery increased 14% and robberies 
declined by 21%. 
208 Daniel Nagin & Gregory Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and 
Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,  39 
Criminology 865, 884-5 (2001); H. LAURENCE ROSS, IMPLICATIONS OF DRINKING-
AND-DRIVING LAW STUDIES FOR DETERRENCE RESEARCH, CRITIQUE AND 
EXPLANATION, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GWYNNE NETTLES (1986)(Timothy Hartnagel 
and Robert Silverman, eds.); H. Laurence Ross, Richard McCleary, & Gary LaFree, Can 
Mandatory Jail Laws Deter Drunk Driving? The Arizona Case, 81 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 156 (1990).  
209 Shuman, supra n. 198 at 122.
210 From 1981 to 1985 alone, 478 new state laws were passed to control drunk 
driving behavior. NATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, 1985. In 
California, there have been major changes to drunk driving laws since 1982, including: 
introducing the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .10% or higher as the legal limit, then 
lowering it to .08% for most adults, and to .01% for persons under the legal drinking age of 21; 
increased fines; and mandatory jail time. Berger & Marelich, supra  n. 279 at 518-520. 
211 Berger & Marelich, supra n. 202  at 518-520.
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the legal blood alcohol concentration limit, increased substantially.212  The 
single most important reason people gave for avoiding drinking and driving 
was the fear of getting into an accident, and the next 5 reasons all reflected fear 
of legal/monetary punishment, i.e., fear of being arrested, going to jail, losing a 
driver’s license, paying higher insurance premiums, and paying legal fines.213
The trend in alcohol-impaired driving is unambiguous: alcohol related traffic 
crashes in the United States have decreased markedly over the past 20 years, 
after legislatures increased punishment for drunk driving and people became 
educated about the new laws.214 This provides at least circumstantial evidence 
that when the costs of drunk driving were raised, that behavior was deterred, as 
predicted by rational choice theory.  The data also supports social control 
theory, i.e., deterrent policies eventually impacted social norms – or perhaps 
revealed them -- relating to drinking and driving.215
Drunk driving and irresponsible sexual behavior have some commonalities. 
Both behaviors are perpetrated by a small percentage of Americans who are 
often young, probably impulsive, and relatively unconcerned about existing 
norms.216  Public disapproval regarding these behaviors is, and probably always 
has been, strong, yet not well-recognized until publicized.217  Both behaviors 
may also result from addiction, yet this did not interfere substantially with the 
212 For example, only 34% of Californians knew about the BAC legal limit in the 
mid 1980’s, while 56% knew about it in 1994. Berger & Marelich, supra n. 202 at 520-522. 
213 Id. at 519-522.
214 Berger & Marelich, supra n. 202 at 520-523. This is consistent with other 
research showing that automobile drivers respond to legal rules, e.g., that liability insurance rates 
impact the decision whether to drive, and the move to no-fault has resulted in more automobile 
deaths. See Richard A. Posner, Can Lawyers Solve The Problems Of the Tort System? 73 Cal. L. 
Rev. 747, 749-50 (1985).
215 An increase in informal control of drunk driving from social forces also was 
clearly apparent from the research.  For example, over 90% of persons responding that their 
friends or relatives would disapprove of their driving after four drinks. See Berger & Marelich, 
supra n. 202 at 519-522. Although it is often assumed that the primary impact of the law is to 
instill fear of punishment, and thereby influence behavior, there is at least circumstantial evidence 
that, over time, laws also influence personal perceptions and social norms which in turn influence 
behavioral choices. Berger & Marelich, supra n. 202 at 518-520, citing J. ANDENAES, THE 
MORAL OR EDUCATIVE INFLUENCE OF CRIMINAL LAW, LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 50-59 (1977)(J.L. 
Tapp & F. J. Levine, eds.); J.R. SNORTUM, DETERRENCE OF ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED 
DRIVING: AN EFFECT IN SEARCH OF A CAUSE, SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE 
DRINKING DRIVER 189-226 (1988)(M.D. Laurence, J.R. Snortum, & F.E. Simring eds.) 
216 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra n. 201 at 918-9, discussing norm-flouting and the 
value some attach to norm-flouting. Strong sanctions may change the value in norm-flouting.
217 Most Americans do not engage in sexual relations with many partners and 
presumably do not approve of such behavior. See supra  sec.  II.C. Regarding drunk driving, it is 
fair to assume that, considering the death and destruction that result from it, the vast majority of 
Americans disapprove of it and do not engage in such behavior.  See supra nn. 214-5. 
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efficacy of  new drunk driving laws and would not necessarily undermine new 
laws strengthening consequences for irresponsible sexual behavior. 
There are a couple of other important aspects of behavioral theory that support 
strict liability to deter risky sexual practices. First, some research indicates that 
people weigh losses more heavily than gains, so laws and the messages they 
carry must exploit humans’ loss aversion tendencies.218  In other words, 
increasing the salience of potential losses resulting from irresponsible sex –
both for disease perpetrators and uninfected persons – is more powerful than 
extolling the virtues of “safe sex.” 219  As noted by Judge Posner, tort law must 
be public knowledge, because if the public is not aware of the law, the law 
cannot shape future behavior.220 A new regime of strict liability for sexual 
disease transmission would attract media attention, 221 and thereby educate the 
public and increase the salience of the risks.
Second, Americans are grossly underestimating the risk of sexual disease and 
potential for civil liability based on the availability heuristic,222 i.e., relying on 
218 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan.L.Rev. 1471, 1536-7 (1998).  They give the example 
that pamphlets emphasizing the benefits to breast self-examinations to avoid cancer are less 
effective than pamphlets stressing the negative consequences of failing to conduct such 
examinations. See infra n. 219. 
219 People are “loss averse” insofar as they will be more unhappy by a loss than 
they will be happy by an equal gain. Sunstein, supra  n. 201 at 950. For example, propagating 
information that breast self-examinations will save lives has been found to be far less effective in 
motivating breast self-exams than propagating information that failure to self-examine can lead to 
death. Sunstein, supra n. 201  at n. 176, citing Beth E. Meyerowitz & Shelly Chaiken, The Effect 
of Message Framing on Breast Self-Examination Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior, 52 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 500, 506-9 (1987).  The present “safe sex” campaign is therefore 
probably less effective than a campaign focusing on harms from irresponsible sex, because the 
latter increases the salience of risks of unsafe sex instead of focusing on the presumed value of 
“safe sex” (an oxymoron in today’s world.) 
220 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 394 (1st ed. 
1972). 
221 The media has exploited sexual disease cases and presumably will continue 
to do so. For example, when NFL star Michael Vick gave Sonya Elliott, a healthcare workers, 
herpes in 2003, the media exploited the case. Similarly, Michelle Rudolph’s $950,000 jury 
verdict against L.A. Dodger pitcher Jose Lima for giving her herpes made national headlines. 
Although the press coverage could be a result of the notoriety of the defendants, at least part of it 
is due to the unusual nature of these cases. A review of the comments posted on internet cites 
relating to these stories demonstrates that most people are surprised that it is possible to sue 
someone for transmitting a sexual disease. Media attention to cases such as these encourages 
more lawsuits, which in turn creates more news.  
222 See Korobkin and Ulen supra n. 197 at 1087.  See also Jolls, Sunstein & 
Thaler, supra n. 218 at 1537. For example, most Americans believe that car accidents kill more 
people than diabetes and stomach cancer, although this is grossly inaccurate.  The “available” 
information regarding car accidents comes from greater media coverage, which leads the public
to believe that deadly car accidents are more prevalent than death from the two diseases. 
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available, salient data as opposed to the true facts, and generally assume that 
good things are more likely than average to happen to them and that bad things 
are less likely than average to happen to them (the “overconfidence bias”).223
The public’s ignorance about the prevalence of sexual disease224 and the 
potential for civil liability exacerbates the problem of overconfidence bias: 
people assume they are more lucky than average based on a terribly inaccurate 
belief about the “average” risk. A negligence-based analysis for sexual disease 
cases exacerbates the problems of the availability heuristic and overconfidence 
bias by reducing the salience of liability risks. Adopting strict liability would 
increase the salience of both liability and health risks because the media will 
continue to exploit sex tort cases, particularly if plaintiffs’ verdicts become 
more common, and presumably will inform the public of new liability 
standards. 
In sum, strict liability raises the price of sexually risky behavior and creates  
much greater certainty of punishment among core group members who 
statistically will most often be defendants in these cases.  It reduces plaintiff’s 
proof burden by eliminating duty and breach analysis, and discourages 
defendants from remaining ignorant of their sexual diseases, or lying about 
them to escape civil liability. 225 In addition, adopting strict liability is 
newsworthy, and will help to educate the public about the high sexual disease 
rate. 
2. Social Control Models of Deterrence, Behavioral Law 
Theories, and Norms
“Wicked people exist. Nothing avails except to set them apart from innocent 
people. And many people, neither wicked nor innocent, but watchful, 
dissembling, and calculating of their chances, ponder our reaction to 
wickedness as a clue to what they might profitably do.”226
Korobkin & Ulen, supra n. 197  at 1088.  See also Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra n. 218 at 1477-
8.
223 Korobkin & Ulen, supra  n. 197  at 1091 & nn. 149-150.
224 See supra Sec. II.A.  People seriously underestimate the disease rate and their 
risk of contracting a sexual disease. 
225 Assumption of the risk is still a viable defense, but in accordance with this 
defense, defendant would have the burden of showing that plaintiff knew of the disease, 
understood its consequences, and voluntarily undertook responsibility for becoming infected.  It 
seems improbable that any sane person would knowingly submit to becoming infected with a 
sexual disease. Indeed, nearly half of men and women surveyed stated that if they were in a new 
relationship and discovered that their partner had an STD, they would be “a lot less likely” to 
continue the relationship. Most people say they would feel angry at a person who gave them a 
STD, although women are more likely (87%) than men (74%) to say so. See ASHA – WHAT 
COST?, supra  n. 2 at 23.
226 JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 128 (rev. ed. 1983).
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“[O]ne who violates a consensus incurs a cost.” 227
Whether norm228  violation and informal social consequences are considered a 
non-quantifiable “cost”229 or a more attenuated means of pressuring others to 
conform to social standards through vicarious experiences, it is clear that norms 
impact social choices. Humans’ fear of informal sanctions, such as disapproval 
by parents, peers, neighbors, and teachers, in the form of embarrassment, 
shame, and loss of community respect may have a greater impact than legal 
punishment per se, because people seek social approval.230 Thus, although 
behavior is guided partly by legal rules and costs of rule-breaking, it is also 
influenced substantially by the relationship between such rules and beliefs, 
values, norms, psychological frames, and cognitive processing.231  The so-
227 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 
96 Mich. L. Rev. 338 (1997). 
228 The term “norm” refers to an informal social standard that people follow 
based on a fear of external non-legal sanctions, such as ostracism, or an internalized sense of 
duty, which can produce guilt, or both. Some people include formal legal rules in the definition of 
norms. See McAdams, supra n. 227 at nn. 54-59 and accompanying text. Cass R. Sunstein 
defines norms as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done 
and what ought not to be done.”  Sunstein, supra n. 201 at 914. Norms arise from a complex set 
of social forces, including feelings and preferences, religious and cultural mores, and legal rules. 
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On The Expressive Function of Law,  144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021,  2026-
29 (1996); .Kahan, supra n. 205 at 357, citing, inter alia, John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, 
Crime, Deterrence, and Right-To-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. Legal Stud. 1, 58 (1997). 
229 Stated alternatively, non-quantifiable benefits include esteem from others, a 
lack of cognitive dissonance (by acting consistent with internal beliefs), and a feeling of 
“belonging” to a social system by complying with norms, benefits not considered in classic 
economic analysis of law. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra n. 197 at 1057. These authors refer to 
“law and behavioral science” as a “species of legal pragmatism,” since it is more useful in setting 
legal policy that will produce a predictable impact on actual human behavior. 
230 Wanda Foglia, Perceptual Deterrence and the Mediating Effect of 
Internalized Norms among Inner-City Teenagers, 34 Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 414 (1997); Daniel Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Enduring Individual Differences 
and Rational Choice Theories of Crime, 27 Law and Society Review 467 (1993); Donald Green, 
Past Behavior as a Measure of Actual Future Behavior: An Unresolved Issue in Perceptual 
Deterrence Research, 80 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 781, 803 (1989); Matthew 
Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence, 21 American Sociological Review 442 
(1976);  Harold Grasmick, Robert Bursik, & Karyl Kinsey, Shame and Embarrassment as 
Deterrents to Noncompliance with the Law: The Case of an Anti-Littering Campaign, Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Baltimore, November, 
1990 p. 3; CHARLES TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE (1980).  In general, 
women are more likely to fear shame and embarrassment than men, which may play a role in the 
gender differences in crime rates – men commit more crime.  See, e.g., Harold Grasmick, Brenda 
Sims Blackwell & Robert Bursik, Changes in the Sex Patterning of Perceived Threats and 
Sanctions 27 Law and Society Review 679 (1993).
231 See generally Sunstein, supra n. 201; Sunstein, supra n. 228; McAdams,
supra  n. 227.  See also Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 
U. Pa. L. Rev 2055 (1996). People have urges, needs, and feelings about choices that cannot be 
measured, only acknowledged. Richard A. Posner defines it this way: “Behavioral economics 
rejects the assumption that people are rational maximizers of preference satisfaction in favor of 
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called “law and behavioral science” movement232 or “behavioral economics”233
is an outgrowth of classic law and economics, created to explain the fact that 
people do not always behave in a rational manner to maximize their wealth, as 
would be predicted by price theory, because of the influence of norms.234 Since 
norm sanctions are costless, they are an especially efficient tool for expressing 
social values and shaping social choices.235
People’s decisions about whether to abide by the law turn on their perception of 
others’ attitude towards the law;236 that is, the meaning of behavior is highly 
assumptions of “bounded rationality”, “bounded willpower,” and “bounded self-interest”.”  See
See Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1551, 1553 (1998). One example of bounded rationality is documented by the fact that people 
often put a higher value on objects that they own as opposed to objects that they do not own, even 
though the objects have the same objective value.  That is, people tend to value the loss of items 
they already own higher than equivalent gains of items they seek to buy.  This is known as the 
“endowment effect” or the “offer/asking gap” and appears to show that people find some sort of 
value above market value in items they own, which may result from feelings about ownership, or 
more generally, from a desire to maintain the status quo (people are somewhat inert and prefer 
status over changing a state of affairs.)  See Korobkin & Ulen, supra n. 197 at 1107-1113. See 
also Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499, 1503-4 (1998). 
232 Korobkin & Ulen, supra n. 197 at 1057. 
233 See Posner, supra n. 231. 
234 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra  n. 197  at 1102-1103 ($10 play ticket 
study), citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and Psychology of 
Choice, 211 Science 453 (1981). 
235 See McAdams, supra n. 227  at 342. Sunstein posits that the “expressive” 
function of law can strengthen norms the law embodies and weaken those it condemns, such as 
by taxing socially undesirable conduct and subsidizing socially desirable choices. Sunstein, supra
n.  201 at 951; Sunstein, supra n. 228 at 2026-31.  Lawrence Lessig argues that legislators and 
judges must understand the social meaning of the behavior sought to be regulated, because it is 
impossible to make policy decisions relating to legal sanctions of social behavior without 
understanding how the law interacts with social meaning. See Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning 
and Social Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2181 (1996);  Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social 
Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1995).  
236 See, e.g., Kahan, supra n. 205 at 354-5 & nn. 18-20. For example, 
neighborhood crime rates are a much better predictor of individual delinquency than social class, 
probably because of the neighborhood perception that crime is common and therefore not 
particularly stigmatizing. Id. at 355 & nn. 21-23.  In another study, British efforts to control 
drunk driving by shaming offenders produced a climate of moral awareness that helped to reduce 
the incidence of drunk driving. John Snortum, Drinking-Driving Compliance in Great Britain: 
The Role of  Law as a ‘Threat’ and as a ‘Moral Eye-Opener’, 18 Journal of Criminal Justice 479 
(1990).  The impact of informal sanctions varies, of course, depending on the size and 
cohesiveness of the community involved, which directly impacts whether the misconduct results 
in public disapproval. Thomas Peete, Trudie Milner, & Michael Welch, Levels of Social 
Integration in Group Contexts and the Effects of Informal Sanction Threat on Deviance, 32 
Criminology 85 (1994). At least in some circumstances, such as a rural ranching community 
governed by longstanding community codes of conduct and informal dispute resolution, norms 
govern behavior irrespective of legal rules, rendering the formal law surprisingly unimportant, 
not even of interest to the parties involved. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 40-64 (1991). 
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contextual, and people tend to choose behavior based on their perception of 
what others are doing.237 A perception that “everyone is doing it” can become 
self-fulfilling, and a parallel perception of little risk of being caught will arise, 
lessening the risk of stigmatism or ostracism.238  Accordingly, if a consensus 
exists, but it is contrary to the public’s perception of the consensus, a norm 
consistent with the consensus will not arise.239  The reason some Americans 
engage in irresponsible sex leading to disease is not because such behavior is 
consistent with the national consensus or that there is no national consensus, 
but that the consensus is not well-known, which destroys its normative 
power.240
237 For example, open signs of disorder in a vicinity, such as prostitution, public 
drunkenness, and panhandling signal to others that disorderly conduct is commonplace, accepted, 
and/or that the government cannot control it. This in turn leads people to think that the chances of 
being punished are low, and esteem costs for violating laws are also low (everyone is doing it.)  
In such an environment, persons who would otherwise be unlikely to engage in such conduct are 
more likely to because of these perceptions. Other research shows that when people have recently 
seen others engage in responsible behavior relative to littering, they are less likely to litter See
Sunstein, supra n. 201 at 905. 
238 Kahan, supra n.  205 at 356-9 & nn. 42-44, 370-371. Kahan argues that this 
is the mechanism that dramatically reduced crime in New York city in a mere 3 year period – the 
police concentrated on “public order” offenses and created an environment where disorder much 
less apparent. Id. at 368-73. Also, in Chicago, the most dramatic reductions in violent crimes 
occurred in the areas in which the city’s gang loitering ordinance was enforced most vigorously.  
Id. at 377.
239 Norm theorist Richard McAdams posits that a norm arises when: 1) there is a 
consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of engaging in a certain behavior; 2) 
there is risk that if a person engages in that behavior, others will discover their behavior; and 3) 
the existence of the consensus and risk of being caught are well-known within the relevant 
population. See McAdams, supra n.  227 at 358.
240 There appears to be a gross divergence between Americans’ actual sexual 
behavior (mostly monogamous) and Americans’ perception of Americans’  sexual behavior – a 
misperception that has arisen in large part due to the media’s portrayal of promiscuous sex as 
ubiquitous. Only 3% of the population engages in promiscuous sex, meaning 5 or more partners 
per year.  Laumann interview, supra n. 15.  But, even if the percent of persons engaging in 
promiscuous sex were higher, even a strong dissent to a consensus does not preclude norm-
formation. A consensus can arise even though a strong dissent exists; unanimity is not required. 
McAdams, supra n. 227 at 380. For example, 20 years ago, it would be considered “rude” to ask 
someone to stop smoking in a restaurant, as the norm was to allow smoking in public.   Then, as 
restaurants began adopting policies against smoking, and local and state lawmaking bodies began 
to enact laws prohibiting smoking in public places, a consensus arose that smoking in public was 
the rude behavior, not the request to cease smoking.  Thus, despite a strong dissent by smokers 
originally, which may have intimidated nonsmokers for some time, the consensus that smoking in 
public places is inappropriate took hold and gained support to the point where, today, there is 
little argument regarding this issue.  The data available today regarding the propriety of sexual 
promiscuity indicates a strong consensus against it, at least in American society at large. To the 
extent that the consensus is not so strong in certain subgroups, such as young Americans, this 
should pose no problem as the information regarding the externalization of costs associated with 
such behavior – if publicized sufficiently - should persuade a critical mass of young people to 
adopt a norm against promiscuous sex, a norm most Americans clearly hold.  Even if a consensus 
did not already exist, McAdams’s analysis of consensus formation predicts that a consensus 
admonishing sexual promiscuity would arise if information regarding the public health threat and 
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The media’s preoccupation with sex and portrayal of casual sex as the norm is a 
factor,241 as is the deeply internalized, unconscious Puritan-based shame factor 
that tends to silence discourse regarding the content of sexual norms. The core 
group responsible for the sexual disease rate is probably influenced by the 
“false” norms created by contemporary media and music, while the majority of 
Americans may be unaware that they are in the majority and exemplify the 
consensus. 
A similar divergence between the consensus and public awareness of the 
consensus existed relative to public smoking before new laws publicized both 
the health risks and public sentiment. Prior to the entrenchment of the 
consensus that smoking in public places was unacceptable, people were afraid 
to speak out against public smoking, perhaps not realizing that they were in the 
majority, as smokers disproportionately represent patrons in bars and 
restaurants in the same way that sexually promiscuous people are 
disproportionately represented on prime time television.242 The “norm-
cascades” that have occurred in the last 30 years relating to smoking occurred 
in large part because the public became aware of the adverse health 
consequences of smoking, and because social norms are a function of public 
information.243
In order to create sexual norms from existing consensus, it is critical to 
propagate information that sexual promiscuity is not consistent with the societal 
consensus and is not condoned by society, particularly if certain subgroups –
such as young Americans - operate under a mistaken belief that promiscuous 
sexual behavior is the norm.244  Considering the data, the only reason why core 
sexual disease perpetrators are not subjected to more outspoken disapproval is 
likely because of a lack of publicity about the public consensus regarding their 
behavior.245 Publicity of the true consensus is crucial to create and entrench 
social costs of disease transmission were better publicized, based on “selfish esteem allocation” 
and other factors. See McAdams, supra n.  227 at 359, quoting Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: 
Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 Ethics 725, 744 (1990). 
241 See supra n. 50.
242 See, e.g., McAdams, supra  n. 227 at 370-80.
243 Sunstein, supra n. 228 at 2035.
244 A legal statement about sexually promiscuous behavior is especially 
important to show that a consensus exists that shuns such behavior, as otherwise young 
Americans may succumb to the “false consensus” effect, that is, the belief that such behavior is 
typical although it is not because other person of their age group, with whom they selectively 
hang around, disproportionately condone such behavior. The first step is to signal to this high risk 
group that the behavior leading to health risks is not consistent with the consensus of most 
Americans, but is aberrational, very dangerous, and engaged in disproportionately among their 
peers. McAdams, supra n. 227 at 401.  In this way, public smoking became antisocial. Id. at 404-
6; see infra  n. 335.   See also Kahan, supra n. 205 at 374. 
245 There is experimental and empirical data that suggest that people will adapt 
their moral convictions to those of their peers once they know what they are, and that such 
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existing sexual norms. Publicity of the sexual disease epidemic per se will 
strengthen and reaffirm the consensus because the risks of  sexual disease are 
much more serious than most Americans understand. Publicity of the consensus 
and health risks increases with strict liability, which  engages the true power of 
a legal threat - its vicarious deterrent effect.246
In sum, sexually irresponsible behavior leading to the current sexual disease 
epidemic has been tolerated, even encouraged, among certain groups, based on 
inaccurate assumptions that could be exposed through the law’s expressive 
function. The law should seek to exploit Americans’ consensus condemning
sexual disease transmission and to create norms consistent with public 
sentiment and social policy.  A strict liability approach to sexual disease 
transmission would further the goals of educating the public and slowing the 
spread of sexual disease. 
V. CONCLUSION
Sex in America has gone through enormous changes in the past century as a 
result of many social forces.  Americans currently face an extraordinarily 
expensive and dangerous health care crisis as a result of the sexual behavior of 
a small percent of Americans. Tort law could do a much better job of 
encouraging socially responsible sexual behavior than it currently does.  
Adopting strict liability for sexual disease transmission is appropriate because 
sexual disease perpetrators must be deterred to the greatest extent possible. In 
addition, strict liability will help express Americans’ consensus condemning 
sexual disease transmission and thereby aid in slowing the disease transmission 
rate through informal sanctions. 
adaptation can occur very rapidly once people are exposed to their peers’ attitudes. Kahan, supra
n.  205 at 358-9 & n. 44. Increased publicity of the public health risks involved in sexual norm 
violation (irresponsible sex leading to sexual disease) should provide sufficient confidence 
among those conforming to the norm and encourage them to speak out, which is what happened 
in relation to public smoking.
246 ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND 
ACTION 330 (1986).






America has a serious sexual problem. The sexual practices of a small 
percentage of Americans has created an unprecedented disease rate that is 
costing the American public about $20 billion per year.  Lawsuits seeking 
damages for sexual disease transmission are on the rise, yet current sex tort 
law is mired with anti-heartbalm sentiment, is unpredictable, and is failing as a 
tool of deterrence, compensation, and education. 
This Article discusses the gravity of the sexual disease crisis, part of which is 
the public’s incredible ignorance about the rate of sexual disease, and tort 
law’s failure to do its part to help educate the public and deter irresponsible 
sexual behavior.  This Article concludes that, based on the high degree of risk 
involved in irresponsible sex, and the problems created by the current 
negligence-based analytical paradigm, strict liability for sexual disease 
transmission should be adopted.  Strict liability would deter sexual disease 
transmission, and educate the public about the sexual disease epidemic, more 
effectively than negligence. 
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